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ABSTRACT
Section 1983 no longer serves as a remedial statute for the people
most in need of its protection. Those who have suffered a violation
of their civil rights at the hands of state authorities, but who cannot
afford a lawyer because they have only modest damages or seek
only equitable remedies, are foreclosed from relief, because lawyers
shun their cases. Today civil rights plaintiffs are treated the same as
ordinary tort plaintiffs by the private bar: without high damages,
civil rights plaintiffs are denied access to the courts because no one
will represent them.
Congress understood that civil rights laws are only as good as
their enforcement. When Congress passed the Civil Rights
Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, it wanted to ensure that
meritorious claims would be heard and that all illegal conduct
would be deterred. The enforcement mechanism that Congress
chose—fee-shifting—guaranteed access to the courts even when
damages were modest or the form of relief was equitable. So-called
“private attorneys general” would accept all meritorious claims,
knowing that if they won they would be paid by the liable
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defendants at reasonable market rates pursuant to the fee-shifting
provisions of the law.
In 1986, however, in Evans v. Jeff D., the U.S. Supreme Court
allowed defendants to condition settlement of civil rights cases on
the waiver or reduction of plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees. Two decades
later, it is evident that Evans destroyed the enforcement mechanism
of the Civil Rights Act. Today civil rights plaintiffs who have only
modest damages or who seek equitable relief are without a remedy.
Although fee waivers (and their effects) were the subject of much
debate after Evans was decided, in recent years the issue has
dropped off the radar screen. It is time for Congress to amend the
Fees Act in order to resurrect section 1983 as the robust remedial
law Congress meant it to be.
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INTRODUCTION

I

1

n the second half of the twentieth century, the Civil Rights Act
became the paradigmatic federal remedial statute. Section 1983
held state governmental actors accountable for violating people’s civil
rights. Yet for many people today, section 1983 provides no remedy.
The courtroom doors are closed to those who seek injunctive relief or
lack high damages, because no lawyers will take their cases. The
failure to provide these people with access to justice has largely gone
unnoticed in recent years, especially in Congress. This Article calls
attention to the problem by declaiming last rites for section 1983.
It is beyond question that Congress intended section 1983 to
benefit people who could not afford a lawyer. In 1976, Congress
passed the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act.2 The Fees Act
guaranteed that even those who could not afford a lawyer would have
access to the courts by virtue of the ingenious device of fee-shifting.
Fee-shifting makes defendants liable for the prevailing plaintiff’s
attorney’s fees,3 thus creating an incentive for private lawyers to take
civil rights cases even when the damages are too low to make those
cases otherwise profitable. As the Senate Report on the bill noted, “If
our civil rights laws are not to become mere hollow pronouncements
which the average citizen cannot enforce, we must maintain the
traditionally effective remedy of fee shifting in these cases.”4 The

1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1871). Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), is credited with giving
new life to a statute that had been mostly dormant for the preceding ninety years. Monroe both
expanded the range of state action that could be challenged under section 1983 and limited the
range of defenses that could be raised. See, e.g., 1 SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND
CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF SECTION 1983, § 2:2 (4th ed. 2006).
2. Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000))
[hereinafter Fees Act].
3. In writing about attorney’s fees, one must first decide the delicate “‘threshold issue of
style’ bedeviling courts and commentators for decades now: Of the eleven alternatives, what is
the correct terminology and spelling of the payment for the work of the prevailing party’s
lawyer?” Gil Deford, The Prevailing Winds After Buckhannon, 38 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 313,
313 n.2 (2002). I will take the majority position and use the singular possessive adjective and the
plural noun. Haymond v. Lundy, 205 F. Supp. 2d 403, 406 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 2002). This is also
permitted by my home circuit. See Ridder v. City of Springfield, 109 F.3d 288, 290 n.1 (6th Cir.
1997).
4. S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 6 (1976). Senator Edward Kennedy, who sponsored the
amended version of the Fees Act, put it this way: “Long experience has demonstrated . . . that
Government enforcement alone cannot accomplish [compliance with the civil rights laws].
Private enforcement of these laws by those most directly affected must continue to receive full
congressional support. Fee shifting provides a mechanism which can give full effect to our civil
rights laws, at no added cost to the Government.” 122 CONG. REC. 31, 472 (1976). The House
Report contained similar sentiments: “The effect of the [Fees Act] will be to promote the
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idea—well proven in the ten years after the bill’s enactment—was
that fee-shifting would produce a corps of “private attorneys general”
to take on illegal state action on a case by case basis, for profit.
In 1986, however, in Evans v. Jeff D.,5 the U.S. Supreme Court held
that defendants in civil rights lawsuits6 could condition settlement on
the waiver of the plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees. Evans gave states a
powerful new defense weapon. By pitting plaintiffs against their own
lawyers, defendants acting under color of state law could eliminate or
greatly reduce their exposure for fees.7 At the same time, every
“Evans offer” accepted would deter plaintiffs’ lawyers from bringing
future cases because, despite the victory for their clients, the losing
lawyers would be unlikely to take on the state again.
Twenty-plus years later, it is clear that Evans destroyed section
1983 as a remedy for civil rights plaintiffs with only modest damages.
Evans foreclosed relief for those plaintiffs by driving their lawyers out
of the civil rights business. Evans also severely limited section 1983 as
a remedy for plaintiffs seeking equitable relief, by driving their
lawyers out of the civil rights business. In both cases, Evans rendered
the “private attorney general” an extinct species.
Evans pushed a small shockwave into the publicinterest/plaintiffs’ bar. Before Evans, many plaintiffs’ lawyers (and
many defense lawyers as well) had assumed that settlement offers
conditioning relief on the waiver or reduction8 of the plaintiffs’
attorney’s fees were unethical,9 or were barred by the Fees Act itself.

enforcement of the . . . civil rights acts, as Congress intended, and to achieve uniformity in those
statutes and justice for all citizens.” H.R. REP. NO. 94-1558, at 9 (1976).
5. 475 U.S. 717 (1986).
6. Although I mean cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, much of this article applies
equally to other remedial statutes with fee-shifting provisions.
7. In 1986, absent a fee waiver, a settlement would have entitled the plaintiff class to
reasonable attorney’s fees at market rates, payable to the “prevailing party” under the feeshifting provisions of the Fees Act.
8. The most common form of an Evans offer is a lump sum offer, which forces the plaintiff
and the lawyer to negotiate who will receive what share of the settlement dollars. The offer is
designed to be high enough that the plaintiff cannot reject it, but low enough that the plaintiff’s
lawyer will be significantly underpaid.
9. Some state bar ethics boards had prohibited such offers (or had signaled tacit
disapproval of them). See Evans, 475 U.S. at 728 n.15 (citing bar opinions from New York,
Maine, and the District of Columbia, as well as one state ethics board (Georgia) that had
approved the practice of simultaneous negotiations). Other states had skirted the issue, so that
the practice—even if discouraged—would not subject a lawyer to discipline for making a
combined merits-and-fees offer. See, e.g., State Bar of Michigan, Formal Ethics Op. C-235
(1985); Connecticut Informal Ethics Op. 85-19 (1985).
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In Evans, however, the Court rejected both claims, thus altering the
balance of power in the negotiation of civil rights cases.
After Evans, there was a brief flurry of activity to minimize its
harm. Publicly-funded legal aid lawyers and private plaintiffs’ civil
rights attorneys scrambled to rewrite their retainer agreements to
avoid Evans problems. But few of those retainers were tested, and
the practical and ethical issues inherent in them were never
satisfactorily resolved. Ten years later, in 1996, when Congress barred
Legal Services Corporation (LSC) offices from accepting attorney’s
10
fees in all cases, the Evans problem disappeared for federally-funded
lawyers. But private plaintiffs’ civil rights lawyers and non-LSC
public interest lawyers remain subject to settlement offers
conditioned on the waiver or reduction of statutory attorney’s fees.
In the first section of this Article, I review Evans and its effect on
civil rights practice in the two decades since its publication. In the
second section, I describe the plaintiffs’ bar’s efforts to contract
around Evans, and I explain why those efforts were unsuccessful. In
the third section, I address the special problem of injunctive relief. In
the fourth section, I describe changes since Evans that have made civil
rights cases even less attractive to private plaintiffs’ lawyers, and I
briefly review the available data on civil rights filings. In the last
section, I address how Congress can revive the Fees Act to restore the
benefits of pre-Evans practice and breathe new life into section 1983.
I. EVANS V. JEFF D.
A. An Overview of the Case
Evans is now old enough that many readers will have forgotten its
specifics. The Idaho Legal Aid Society filed suit against state officials
on behalf of a class of disabled children. The plaintiffs’ core claims
10. From the start, the Legal Services Corporation Act restricted the use of LSC funds. See
42 U.S.C. §§ 2996e–2996f (1974). More restrictions were added over the years. In 1996, an
unusually hostile Congress imposed sweeping new restrictions, limiting the practice of LSC
lawyers. The 1996 amendments barred LSC offices from participating in class action litigation
and from collecting or retaining “attorney’s fees pursuant to any federal or state law permitting
or requiring the awarding of such fees.” See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and
Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 504(a)(7), 504(a)(13), 110 Stat. 1321, 1353–
54 (1996). The only restriction to have been successfully challenged was section 504(a)(16),
which prohibited advocacy “to amend or otherwise challenge existing law.” The Supreme Court
struck down that restriction on First Amendment grounds in Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez,
531 U.S. 533 (2001).
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were that Idaho’s educational and medical services for the children
were constitutionally deficient, and thus actionable under section
1983.
The parties quickly worked out a settlement as to the educational
services, and counsel signed a stipulation disposing of that piece of the
case. The agreement provided that each side would bear its own
attorney’s fees and costs incurred to that point. The district court
entered an order approving the partial settlement.11 The parties could
not agree, however, as to the medical services, so the case went
forward. As the Idaho Legal Aid Society’s time spent on the case
escalated, the defendants’ settlement proposals always included a
demand for a waiver of the plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees, while the
plaintiffs’ counter-proposals rejected any fee waiver. Indeed, the
Legal Aid Society instructed its lawyer handling the case to turn down
any proposal conditioned on the waiver of fees.12
Cross motions for summary judgment narrowed the plaintiffs’
claims, but the district court eventually set the case for trial. A week
before trial, the state defendants made a new proposal that offered
virtually all the injunctive relief the plaintiffs had sought in their
complaint, and “more than the district court in earlier hearings had
indicated it was willing to grant.”13 Faced with an offer that gave the
plaintiffs everything they wanted (except fees), the plaintiffs’ lawyer
“ultimately determined that his ethical obligation to his clients
mandated acceptance of the proposal.”14 He signed the consent
decree—which included a waiver of attorney’s fees—“if so approved
15
by the Court.”
The lawyer then asked the court to approve the settlement except
for the waiver of fees. At the hearing on that motion, the plaintiffs’
lawyer argued first that the defendants’ offer exploited his ethical
duty to his clients. He said that he was effectively “forced” to waive
his fees or lose the ideal settlement on the merits and go forward to
16
trial. Second, he argued that a settlement conditioned on the waiver
11. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (requiring class settlements to be court-approved).
12. Evans, 475 U.S. at 722.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 722 n.5.
16. Id. at 723–24. Evans was complicated by the fact that the lead counsel was not just the
plaintiffs’ lawyer but also their “next friend” on the pleadings. His dual role highlighted the
ethical dilemma because, as the decision-maker for the class, he would have had to negotiate
with himself about the relative value of the settlement versus the fees. Thus, having created an
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of fees violated the policy underlying the fee-shifting provisions of the
Fees Act.
The defendants countered that the settlement was no different
from any other commercial settlement involving the expenditure of
state funds. That is, they claimed that the promised medical services
were not required by law, but the defendants were willing to provide
them to put an end to the litigation and to cap the state’s costs. The
plaintiffs, according to the defendants, were free to accept or reject
the settlement offer, the same as in any other litigation. What the
plaintiffs could not get was both the settlement and their attorney’s
17
fees.
The district court sided with the defendants. It denied the
plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees and issued a stay pending appeal.18 On
appeal the Ninth Circuit reversed, invalidating the fee waiver while
leaving the rest of the consent decree intact. The court relied on
circuit precedent that “‘disapproved simultaneous negotiation of
settlements and attorney’s fees’ absent a showing of ‘unusual
circumstances.’”19 The Ninth Circuit said that any other rule would
violate the “strong federal policy embodied in the Fees Act,” which
“normally requires an award of fees to prevailing plaintiffs in civil
rights actions, including those who have prevailed through
20
settlement.” The court remanded the case for a determination of
reasonable attorney’s fees, finding that “[t]he historical background of
both rule 23 and section 1983, as well as our experience since their
enactment, compel the conclusion that a stipulated waiver of all
attorney’s fees obtained solely as a condition for obtaining relief for
the class should not be accepted by the court.”21

internal conflict of interest, he had little choice but to trade Idaho Legal Aid’s fees for his “next
friends’” advantageous settlement.
17. Id. at 721–24.
18. The record is silent as to whether or not, at this point, the plaintiffs’ counsel felt that he
had a similar ethical obligation to drop the appeal. The situation had not changed. As long as
the stay remained in effect, the class would not get the medical services the defendants had
agreed to supply, only because the plaintiffs’ lawyer, acting as their next friend, had chosen to
appeal the case in order to win back the fees he had waived (in return for relief) in the first
place. The plaintiffs’ counsel sought and got emergency orders in the court of appeals requiring
enforcement pending the appeal. Id. at 724.
19. Id. at 725 (quoting Jeff D. v. Evans, 743 F.2d 648, 652 (9th Cir. 1984)). The precedent
cited was Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1980), which had disapproved the
simultaneous negotiation of merits and fees to avoid conflict between the plaintiffs and their
attorneys.
20. Evans, 475 U.S. at 724–25.
21. Id. at 725 (quoting Jeff D. v. Evans, 743 F.2d at 652).
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The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari because of a circuit
split on this issue.22 In a 6-3 decision authored by Justice Stevens, the
Court reversed the Ninth Circuit. The Court said, first, that “Rule
23(e) does not give a court the power, in advance of trial, to modify a
proposed consent decree and order its acceptance over either party’s
objection.”23 Thus, if the fee waiver in Evans violated public policy,
the entire agreement was unenforceable—the court of appeals could
not rewrite the consent decree to suit the court’s own sense of what
ought to be done. The only question, therefore, said the Court, was
whether “the District Court had a duty to reject the proposed
settlement because it included a waiver of statutorily authorized
attorney’s fees.”24
The majority gave the plaintiffs’ ethical argument short shrift,
disposing of it in a single paragraph:
[W]e do not believe that the “dilemma” was an “ethical” one in the
sense that [the lawyer] had to choose between conflicting duties
under the prevailing norms of professional conduct. Plainly, [the
lawyer] had no ethical obligation to seek a statutory fee award.
His ethical duty was to serve his clients loyally and competently.
Since the proposal to settle the merits was more favorable than the
probable outcome of the trial, [his] decision to recommend
acceptance was consistent with the highest standards of our
profession. The District Court, therefore, correctly concluded that
approval of the settlement involved no breach of ethics in this
25
case.

The Court said that the defect, if any, in the negotiated fee waiver
must be traced not to the rules of ethics but to the Fees Act.26

22. The Ninth Circuit, in Mendoza, 623 F.2d at 1338, and the Third Circuit, in Prandini v.
National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015 (1977), had strongly discouraged simultaneous negotiation of
merits and fees, while four circuits had permitted it, at least in some circumstances. Evans, 475
U.S. at 726 n.10.
23. Evans, 475 U.S. at 727.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 727–28 (footnotes omitted). The thorny ethical issue, of course, was not whether
the plaintiffs’ LSC attorneys could accept the offer and renounce their own fees, but whether
they were required to. On that question, the Court’s analysis was singularly unhelpful.
26. The Court noted that there was no fee agreement because the plaintiffs were minors
and one of the lawyers was their next friend. “[The] special character of both the class and its
attorney-client relationship . . . explains why [Legal Aid] did not enter into any agreement
covering the various contingencies that might arise during the course of settlement negotiations
of a class action of this kind.” Id. at 721.
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Turning to the purpose of the Fees Act, the Court found that
although Congress expected the fee-shifting provision to attract socalled “private attorneys general” to vindicate the rights of people
deprived of their civil rights, Congress wrote into the Act only “a
statutory eligibility for a discretionary award of attorney’s fees,” and it
gave that eligibility only to the prevailing party.27 Congress did not
give the attorney a right to the fees, nor did it intend to render them
non-negotiable “any more than it intended to bar a concession on
damages to secure broader injunctive relief.”28 Accordingly, the Court
said that the fee-shifting provision should be viewed as simply one of
“the arsenal of remedies available to combat violations of civil
rights.”29
In dissent, Justice Brennan reviewed the statutory history of the
Fees Act in detail.30 He argued that the Act’s primary purpose was to
induce private lawyers to handle plaintiffs’ civil rights cases. In his
view, that inducement must be preserved even at the cost of losing
some settlements. He wrote that simultaneous negotiation of the
merits and fees should therefore be limited to ensure that plaintiffs’
27. Id. at 730.
28. Id. at 731.
29. Id. at 732.
30. Id. at 745–52 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The legislative history of the Fees Act is both
atypically thick and unusually consistent and clear. See Jeffrey S. Brand, The Second Front in
the Fight for Civil Rights: The Supreme Court, Congress, and Statutory Fees, 69 TEX. L. REV. 291,
309–15, 364 n.422 (1990) (noting that the history is more than 300 pages long, with almost no
disagreement, and that the bill passed 57-15 in the Senate and 306-68 in the House). From the
statutory history, Brand identifies the Fees Act’s intended “benchmarks” as (1) attracting
lawyers for private enforcement of the civil rights laws; (2) increasing the number of civil rights
cases by increasing access to lawyers; (3) ensuring competitive rates to accomplish (1) and (2);
and (4) promoting close supervision over fee issues decided by the district courts. Id.; see also
James Kraus, Ethical and Legal Concerns in Compelling the Waiver of Attorney’s Fees by Civil
Rights Litigants in Exchange for Favorable Settlement of Cases Under the Civil Rights Attorney’s
Fees Awards Act of 1976, 29 VILL. L. REV. 597, 603–04 (1984). Perhaps the most eloquent
statement of the bill’s purpose was made by its original sponsor:
The problem of unequal access to the courts in order to vindicate congressional
policies and enforce the law is not simply a problem for lawyers and courts.
Encouraging adequate representation is essential if the laws of this Nation are to be
enforced. Congress passes a great deal of lofty legislation promising equal rights to
all. Although some of these laws can be enforced by the Justice Department or other
Federal agencies, most of the responsibility for enforcement has to rest upon private
citizens, who must go to court to prove a violation of law. . . . But without the
availability of counsel fees, these rights exist only on paper. Private citizens must be
given not only the rights to go to court, but also the legal resources. If the citizen does
not have the resources, his day in court is denied him; the congressional policy which
he seeks to assert and vindicate goes unvindicated; and the entire nation, not just the
individual citizen, suffers.
122 CONG. REC. 33, 313 (1976) (statement of Sen. Tunney).
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lawyers earn a reasonable fee. Of special force was Justice Brennan’s
concession that fees could still be negotiated across a considerable
range, as long as the final settlement—subject to the district court’s
approval—provided for a reasonable fee. He thought that all the
benefits of simultaneous negotiation, including the defendants’ need
to know the bottom line, could thus be preserved without
jeopardizing the primary statutory purpose of the Fees Act: to attract
lawyers to handle civil rights cases that would otherwise go
unlitigated. Justice Brennan said that the Court had put its own
judicial policy (to promote settlements in order to reduce dockets)
over Congress’s statutory policy to guarantee lawyers for civil rights
plaintiffs.31
Justice Brennan’s concern was that once the practice of
negotiating fee waivers had the Court’s imprimatur, defense counsel
would invariably use it. Indeed, he thought that defense lawyers
would be “remiss not to demand that the plaintiff waive statutory
attorney’s fees,” and he predicted that “in the future, we must expect
settlement offers routinely to contain demands for waivers of
statutory fees.”32 Brennan foresaw that routine fee waiver demands
would drive “private attorneys general” out of the market for civil
rights cases.
In the majority opinion, Justice Stevens belittled Brennan’s
concern:
We are cognizant of the possibility that decisions by individual
clients to bargain away fee awards may, in the aggregate and in the
long run, diminish lawyers’ expectations of statutory fees in civil
rights cases. If this occurred, the pool of lawyers willing to
represent plaintiffs in such cases might shrink, constricting the
“effective access to the judicial process” for persons with civil
rights grievances which the Fees Act was intended to provide.
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1558, p. 1 (1976). That the “tyranny of small

31. Evans, 475 U.S. at 755–66. Both at the time and since, commentators have strongly
supported Justice Brennan’s view that in Evans the Court ignored or understated the primary
purpose of the Fees Act—to enforce the civil rights acts by inducing private lawyers to take
cases that they otherwise could not afford to accept. See, e.g., Brand, supra note 30, at 363;
Daniel L. Lowery, “Prevailing Party” Status for Civil Rights Plaintiffs: Fee-shifting’s Shifting
Threshold, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1141, 1446 (1993); Jay H. Krulewitch, Note, Anatomy of a Double
Whammy: The Application of Rule 68 Offers and Fee Waivers of Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees
under Section 1988, 37 DRAKE L. REV. 103, 105, 128 (1987/1988); Randy M. Stedman, Note,
Evans v. Jeff D.: Putting Private Attorneys General on Waiver, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1273, 1289
(1988).
32. Evans, 475 U.S. at 758.

01__REINGOLD_FINAL.DOC

2008]

7/23/2008 9:32:30 AM

REQUIEM FOR SECTION 1983

11

decisions” may operate in this fashion is not to say there is any
reason or documentation to support such a concern at the present
time. Comment on this issue is therefore premature at this
juncture. We believe, however, that as a practical matter the
33
likelihood of this circumstance arising is remote.

More than two decades later, we can see whose crystal ball was
clearer. If anything, Justice Brennan was too sanguine, and Justice
Stevens was just plain wrong. Although we lack an absolute empirical
34
answer, there is much evidence (and near unanimity within the
plaintiffs’ bar) that Evans killed section 1983 as a remedial statute for
plaintiffs in need of private lawyers to litigate civil rights cases
involving only modest damages or equitable relief. Today the
“tyranny of small decisions” is the ruling order. Upon reflection, and
as Justice Brennan and a host of commentators35 foresaw, this result is
36
wholly unsurprising.
B. The Effects of Evans Since 1986
1. What Section 1988 Was Supposed to Do—The “American
rule” on attorney’s fees has long held that parties should bear their

33. Id. at 741 n.34 (majority opinion) (citation omitted).
34. No one has done a formal long-term empirical study of this issue, but Julie Davies
interviewed some thirty-five plaintiffs’ civil rights lawyers in 1996–97 to try to get a handle on
the effect of Evans and other cases that had made winning attorney’s fees more difficult. See
Julie Davies, Federal Civil Rights Practice in the 1990's: The Dichotomy Between Reality and
Theory, 48 HAST. L.J. 197 (1997). Her conclusion was that most civil rights cases are treated no
differently from other tort cases, and that therefore unless the plaintiff has substantial damages,
the plaintiff will not find a lawyer to represent him. Id. at 261–67. See also Daniel Nazer, Note,
Conflict and Solidarity: The Legacy of Evans v. Jeff D., 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 499, 537–38
(2004) (agreeing with Davies as to the private bar, but arguing that Evans had a less pronounced
effect in non-profit settings). Both authors understate the effect of Evans to the extent that they
report that demands for fee waivers are relatively rare. In practice it is nearly always fee
reductions that preclude plaintiffs’ lawyers from making money on civil rights cases, not full fee
waivers. See infra Part II.
35. See, e.g., David Paul Enzminger, Case Note, Waive Goodbye to Law in the Public
Interest: The Use of Coercive Waivers in Civil Rights Actions, Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717
(1986), 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 749 (1987); F. Allen Phaup II, Case Note, Evans v. Jeff D.: Putting the
Squeeze on Private Attorneys General, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 389 (1987); Debra Watts
McCormick, The Effect of Evans v. Jeff D. on Civil Rights Litigation, 12 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV.
415, 416 (1987); Judy Elledge, Note, Evans v. Jeff D.: No Judicial Prohibition of Coerced
Waivers of Attorney’s Fees under the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 24 HOUS.
L. REV. 1021, 1022 (1987); Stedman, supra note 31; Krulewitch, supra note 31; Neil M.
Goldstein, Comment, Preserving Fee-Shifting after Evans v. Jeff D.: Joint Attorney/Client
Control of Settlement, 11 INDUS. REL. L.J. 267 (1989).
36. What is surprising is that Congress has allowed the failure of the Fees Act to persist for
two decades.

01__REINGOLD_FINAL.DOC

12

7/23/2008 9:32:30 AM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 3:1

own costs of litigation. An exception developed, however, where a
plaintiff’s success established or vindicated important public rights.37
The plaintiff was said to have acted as a “private attorney general”
38
not just for the plaintiff’s own benefit but in the public interest. By
the 1970s, U.S. courts were beginning to award attorney’s fees in such
cases, even if the underlying statute did not contain a fee-shifting
provision. In 1975, however, in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v.
Wilderness Society,39 the U.S. Supreme Court put a halt to that
practice. The Court held that only Congress, and not the courts,
could change the American rule and authorize fee-shifting.
Congress reacted swiftly, passing the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees
40
The Fees Act permitted courts to award
Awards Act in 1976.
reasonable attorney’s fees (at market rates) to prevailing plaintiffs in
civil rights actions. The statutory history of section 1988 made clear
that its purpose was to guarantee enforcement of the Civil Rights Act
through the “private attorneys general” model.41 The Congressional
Record was filled with comments by the bill’s supporters that without
fee-shifting the poor and underprivileged would have legal rights
without a remedy: absent fee-shifting, the courthouse door would be
barred to them.
2. Damages Cases: Comparing Fee-Shifting to the Normal Tort
Regime—In thinking about the effect of Evans, it is useful to look at
the conventional tort regime that matches plaintiffs with tort lawyers
37. For a useful review of the development of this exception to the American rule, see
Comment, Court Awarded Attorney’s Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV.
636, 666 (1974).
38. In Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam), the Court
had held that a prevailing plaintiff under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 should
ordinarily recover fees unless special circumstances rendered such an award unjust—even
though on its face the Act made the granting of fees discretionary with the district court. The
Court said that when the Act was passed, Congress knew that enforcement would prove difficult
and that the nation would have to rely in part upon private litigation as a means of securing
broad compliance with the law. Such litigation “is thus private in form only,” because if a
plaintiff obtains relief, he does so “not for himself alone but also as a ‘private attorney general,’
vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority.” Id. at 401–02. The term
“private attorney general” has been traced back to Judge Jerome Frank in Associated Industries
of New York State v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943). See David Shub, Note, Private
Attorneys General, Prevailing Parties, and Public Benefit: Attorney’s Fees Awards for Civil
Rights Plaintiffs, 42 DUKE L.J. 706, 708 n.10 (1992).
39. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
40. Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000)).
41. In Evans, Justice Brennan said the statutory history established the point with
“monotonous clarity.” Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 749 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See
also Brand, supra note 30, at 309–15.
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through the marketplace.42 In most tort cases, where fee-shifting is
not part of the equation, plaintiffs’ lawyers are paid on a contingent
fee basis. The lawyer must therefore do a careful cost–benefit
43
analysis to determine if she can make money on a case. The lawyer
knows she will have to pay the litigation expenses up front, and she
assumes she will be paid (in the form of a contingent fee) only if she
44
wins a favorable verdict or settlement.
Most plaintiffs’ lawyers
therefore will not take a contingent-fee case unless: (1) the claim is
strong enough to give the defense reasonable pause about going to
trial; and (2) the damages are high enough that the lawyer’s
contingent share of any settlement will pay a reasonable return on
what the lawyer has invested in the case, at the point when settlement
is likely to occur.
At bottom—from the perspective of plaintiffs’ lawyers—there are
just four categories of contingent tort cases, which can be set out in
the following rough matrix:
1. Good Liability/Good Damages
2. Good Liability/Bad Damages

3. Bad Liability/Good Damages
4. Bad Liability/Bad Damages

I will briefly review the four categories, the choices the plaintiff’s
lawyer must make with each, and how fee-shifting laws like section
1988 change the calculation.
Category One: Good Liability/Good Damages—The goodliability/good-damages case is the case every tort lawyer wants.
Although the lawyer always has some small risk of an outright loss (or
of her client being risk-averse and accepting a settlement below the

42. For this discussion I assume that the civil rights plaintiff is seeking damages, and not
just injunctive relief. I discuss injunctive relief in Part III, infra.
43. For the sake of clarity and consistency, throughout this discussion I will use the singular
masculine pronoun “he” when referring to the client, and the singular feminine pronoun “she”
when referring to the lawyer. Because there are usually multiple defendants (and often multiple
defense lawyers) in a case, I will refer to the defendants and their counsel using the plural
pronoun “they.”
44. The percentage of the contingent fee is controlled by state law and varies considerably.
For example, Michigan caps the contingent fee in tort cases at one-third, see MICH. CT. R.
8.121(B) (1985) (setting the one-third cap on fees); MICH. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1.5
(2006) (requiring that fees be “reasonable” and enumerating factors to be considered in
evaluating reasonableness), while Oklahoma permits the lawyer and client to work as equal
partners, sharing the recovery 50/50. See, e.g., Martin v. Buckman, 883 P.2d 185, 192 (Okla.
App. Div. 4 1994) (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 5 § 7 (1991)).
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“value” of the case), the odds are high that the lawyer will earn a
hefty contingent fee. Indeed, translated into hourly rates the
contingent fee may strike the public and the defense bar (and often
45
the bench) as too high.
A civil rights plaintiff with a good-liability/good-damages case can
therefore always find a lawyer, with or without a fee-shifting law. Feeshifting is not necessary for this plaintiff to retain counsel because the
contingent fee system takes care of him in the same way that it takes
care of non-civil-rights tort plaintiffs with good-liability/gooddamages claims. No extra inducement is needed for the lawyer to
take the case because the competition for good-liability/good46
damages cases is always keen: lawyers line up for them.
Category Two: Good Liability/Bad Damages—The goodliability/bad-damages case, whether in tort or civil rights, is almost
never accepted by the plaintiffs’ bar. The plaintiff’s lawyer has little
bargaining power because the claim is not worth much. This is no
secret—the defense attorneys, too, know that the claim is not worth
much, and the defense can put great pressure on the plaintiff’s lawyer
by running up her hours with motions and discovery. Very soon
every extra hour that the plaintiff’s lawyer puts into the case is an
hour lost, as the lawyer’s time exceeds the value of the contingent
47
percentage of any reasonable settlement or verdict. In effect, the
defense can paper the plaintiff’s lawyer to death, until she has no
choice but to cut her losses. The more successful or seasoned the
plaintiff’s lawyer, the less likely she is to accept a good-liability/baddamages case in the first instance.48
For this category, fee-shifting radically changes the client’s ability
to hire a lawyer. With a fee-shifting regime in a good-liability/bad45. The justification for the high fee is that it is a reward for the risk that the plaintiff’s
lawyer takes. Even with good-liability/good-damages cases, some of the cases may still be lost
or settle at a loss, after the lawyer has spent a lot of time and money on them.
46. Competition for clients takes the form of aggressive advertising—or elaborate displays
of past success—rather than price competition. I have yet to see a lawyer’s ad that read,
“Lowest percentage on the market—will not be undersold.”
47. Occasionally a novice tort lawyer might get stuck with one of these cases. Having no
other work to do, she might foolishly say yes to a case that will cost more to litigate than she can
recover. The lesson will be painful and one not soon forgotten.
48. One exception to this generalization is the overwhelmingly strong case with low
damages, which a lawyer might accept on the theory that she can get a quick settlement for very
little work. Such a case may settle even before the filing of a lawsuit. But the prototypical
good-liability/bad-damages case is rejected out of hand by the private bar, because litigation
costs will exceed any likely recovery.
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damages case, the lawyer expects to be paid not from a percentage of
the settlement or verdict but by the defendants pursuant to the feeshifting law. The lawyer who takes the case expects to win (good
liability), and expects to earn a reasonable hourly rate for her services,
paid by the defendants. In short, the “private attorneys general”
model is the only way a client with a good-liability/bad-damages case
is ever going to find a lawyer, because without fee-shifting, there is no
market for his case.
Category Three: Bad Liability/Good Damages—The badliability/good-damages case is a high-risk proposition for a plaintiffs’
lawyer. Often the defense will not consider settlement unless or until
the plaintiff has survived summary judgment. Even after summary
judgment, the defendants may choose to go to trial because they have
several bites left at the apple: they can win a directed verdict, a jury
verdict at trial, a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or a reversal
of the denial of summary judgment or of an adverse verdict on
appeal. The litigation costs will likely be very high. Therefore, unless
the damages are extraordinarily high, most experienced lawyers will
avoid such cases, knowing that they can become sinkholes of costs.
(Recall the environmental lawsuit described in A Civil Action49—a
classic bad-liability/good-damages case that destroyed the firm and
50
In most bad-liability/goodbankrupted the plaintiffs’ counsel.)
damages cases, the plaintiff will not be able to find a lawyer, because
even a quick cost–benefit analysis will confirm that the lawyer cannot
make money on the file.
Fee-shifting also has virtually no effect in bad-liability/gooddamages cases: whether in the end a lawyer says yes or no to the case,
the availability of statutory attorney’s fees is largely irrelevant. The
consenting lawyer knows that the case probably will not settle quickly
or easily (because of the bad liability), and that if the plaintiff loses,
the lawyer will earn nothing. The bait that lures the rare lawyer to
such a case is not the incentive of fee-shifting but the possibility of
getting a percentage of a huge verdict or settlement. It is the far-

49. JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION (Jonathan Harr & Marty Asher eds., Random
House 1995).
50. It is worth noting, however, that category three (bad-liability/good-damages) cases that
get past summary judgment might settle. The combination of high transaction costs and high
exposure for the defense, together with the plaintiff’s risk of non-recovery, can be a recipe for
settlement, because both sides have reason to compromise.
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above-market-rate payout, not reasonable attorney’s fees, that draws
a lawyer to take this type of case—if a lawyer can be found at all.
Category Four: Bad Liability/Bad Damages—Only a pro se
litigant or a foolhardy lawyer files a bad-liability/bad-damages case.
The odds of winning are too low for the plaintiff ever to prevail, and
the damages are too low to support a pure contingent fee, even if a
miraculous victory were to occur.
No plaintiff with a badliability/bad-damages civil rights case can find a lawyer, with or
without a fee-shifting law, because there is no market for it.
3. Lessons from the Matrix—This simple matrix clarifies the
obvious: without fee-shifting, tort plaintiffs typically are only able to
find counsel if their lawsuit fits category one (and rarely category
three) above. Without good damages, the market for legal services is
closed to tort plaintiffs. They must abandon their claims or proceed in
pro per. The matrix illustrates that a fee-shifting statute like section
1988 only serves as a significant inducement to lawyers in goodliability/bad-damages cases, because only in that category does the
plaintiff’s lawyer expect to be paid through a fee award. Fee-shifting
serves little or no purpose in the other three categories, because in
each the plaintiff can already secure a lawyer through the contingent
fee system, or the plaintiff cannot secure a lawyer at all, even with
fee-shifting.
Congress passed section 1988 to induce “private attorneys
general” to represent plaintiffs whose civil rights were violated. But
in the good-damages cases, lawyers do not need fee-shifting laws to
entice them to take cases because the contingent fee system already
entices them with superb market efficiency. Therefore the target
population of section 1988 had to be people with meritorious claims
who otherwise could not find a lawyer to represent them and for
whom fee-shifting would make a difference—those whose rights had
clearly been violated but who suffered low or modest damages.51
This makes perfect sense. When Congress attaches a fee-shifting
provision to a remedy-creating law, it sends a strong message.
Congress is saying that the rights secured by the law are important
enough that the injured plaintiff should be compensated and the legal
51. Obviously the same argument applies with even more force to cases seeking only
declaratory or injunctive relief. But for fee-shifting, plaintiffs seeking equitable remedies would
not find private counsel to represent them. See infra Part III.
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wrong righted, even if the dollar value of the harm is relatively low.
Tort laws make plaintiffs shop in the market for a lawyer, where most
meritorious but low-value cases will go unclaimed. But laws like the
Civil Rights Act, by virtue of their fee-shifting provisions, are to be
enforced regardless of whether or not the market would otherwise
enforce them.
Fee-shifting also makes the most sense as public policy in goodliability/bad-damages cases. Where Congress has rejected the
American rule and granted the prevailing plaintiff an entitlement to
attorney’s fees from the losing defendants, the underlying cause of
action typically involves significant legal rights or litigation between
parties of unequal power. Most federal fee-shifting statutes, like
section 1988, are attached to laws that address major public issues like
civil rights, discrimination, consumer protection, or unfair action by
the government.52 The cases tend to be ones where we view the right
itself as important, even if the harm—measured in terms of money
damages—is often relatively small. Put concretely, Congress wants
rogue cops, or discriminating corporations, or predatory lenders, to be
held accountable for these important civil wrongs and to be deterred
by the threat of litigation, even in cases where the money damages are
modest.53
At bottom, these statutes are intended to regulate behavior. The
vehicle to deter the unwanted behavior is the private lawsuit: the
defendants risk having to pay the plaintiff a judgment and his
attorney’s fees if the defendants defend and lose. In a goodliability/bad-damages case, that statutory incentive can only work if
the defendant is forced to pay the plaintiff’s attorney’s fees.
Otherwise the damages alone are too low either to induce plaintiffs’
counsel to bring the case or to deter the unwanted conduct. Without
the risk of having to pay attorney’s fees, the defendants will either
52. By 1985, Congress had already passed more than 100 fee-shifting statutes. See Marek v.
Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, app. 43–51 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (listing and categorizing federal
fee-shifting laws).
53. In City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561 (1986), the Court held that prevailing
plaintiffs can recover their full attorney’s fees even where the fees far exceed the amount of the
damages. “Because damages awards do not reflect fully the public benefit advanced by civil
rights litigation, Congress did not intend for fees in civil rights cases, unlike most private cases,
to depend on obtaining substantial monetary relief.” Id. at 575. Courts routinely award full
attorney’s fees to plaintiffs who prevail at trial even where the fees are ten-to-forty times the
amount of the damages. See MICHAEL AVERY, DAVID RUDOVSKY & KAREN BLUM, POLICE
MISCONDUCT LAW AND LITIGATION § 14:2 (3d ed. 2003) (listing examples of lowdamages/high-fees awards).
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never be sued at all, or they will view the low damages as an
acceptable (and deductible) cost of their illegal conduct, happily
paying for their sins.
4. Evans Effects—Because fee-shifting attracts plaintiffs’ lawyers
only in good-liability/bad-damages cases, the harm caused by Evans is
more serious than would appear at first glance. Before Evans, feeshifting guaranteed that a good-liability/bad-damages civil rights
plaintiff could find a lawyer to represent him and to vindicate his
rights. The legal wrong would be righted as Congress intended; the
plaintiff would be made whole and the lawyer would earn a living at
market rates for her socially useful work. After Evans, the
defendants can argue persuasively (in a good-liability/bad-damages
case) that their settlement offer is great for the plaintiff, and that the
only obstacle to settlement is the hourly fee claimed by the plaintiff’s
attorney. The defendants will pay the plaintiff everything—a small
sum—if the attorney will walk away from (or reduce) her fee. All the
bargaining power rests with the defendants, and the plaintiff and his
attorney are put in a position of open conflict with each other.54
The matrix teaches one other useful point. Although fee-shifting
helps civil rights plaintiffs get lawyers only in good-liability/baddamages cases, in the other three categories of cases Evans offers by
the defendants will not work. In a good-liability/good-damages case,
the lawyer’s contingent fees will typically exceed any fees paid under
the fee-shifting law, and therefore the defense cannot plausibly offer a
settlement that does not include significant fees. The fee-shifting act
will be irrelevant, because the pattern of bargaining will mimic the
pattern of bargaining that would occur in any good-liability/gooddamages tort case where fee-shifting is not available.
In a bad-liability/good-damages case, the Evans offer will be
equally irrelevant. The rare plaintiffs’ lawyer who takes such a case
does so not for the hourly fee, but for the chance at a big verdict or
settlement. As with a category-one case, as long as a third of the

54. This conflict is different from the conflict that arises in pure contingent fee cases,
because in those cases (which almost always involve high damages) the lawyer and the client go
into each case expecting that its value will be high enough (1) to satisfy the client’s wish to be
made whole, and (2) to pay the lawyer a reasonable if not generous fee. Indeed, if the lawyer
had thought, for example, that two-thirds of the payout would not be enough to satisfy the client
and one-third of the payout would not be enough to cover her own costs and time, she would
not have taken the case. And, of course, if both the lawyer and the client got it wrong, they
share the loss.
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settlement exceeds the value of the billable hours in the case at the
point of the offer, the case will negotiate in the same way as a
conventional tort case, and an Evans offer will be futile. Of course, in
a good-damages case, the contingent fee will normally exceed the
total billings at the point of serious negotiation; indeed, that would be
the very calculation that led the lawyer to accept the case in the first
place. Finally, in a bad-liability/bad-damages case, there will be no
lawyer at all, and thus no Evans negotiation will occur.
5. Summary—Two propositions result: (1) that fee-shifting only
affects the market for plaintiffs with good-liability/bad-damages cases;
and (2) that an Evans offer can usually be effective as a defense
negotiation strategy only in good-liability/bad-damages cases. What
Evans does, then, is to reverse the rationale for fee-shifting. It
deprives plaintiffs of lawyers in the one category of civil rights cases
where fee-shifting is needed to attract lawyers by guaranteeing that
lawyers will not be able to make money on those cases. At the same
time, it potentially delivers extra money in the form of fee awards or
higher fee settlements to plaintiffs and their lawyers in cases where
the lawyers would have taken the cases even without the added
inducement of fee-shifting.55 Evans thus inverts the logic of feeshifting laws and completely undermines their purpose.
Before Evans, if state officials clearly violated a person’s
constitutional rights, the plaintiffs’ bar would step forward to right the
wrong, even if the damages were quite low. Today no plaintiffs’
56
57
lawyer will touch such a case. The litigation costs are too steep.
The possibility of an interlocutory appeal (on the issue of qualified

55. If fees are awarded post-verdict, the plaintiff and the lawyer may both recover more in
a case the lawyer would have taken on a contingent basis anyway. To the extent that the
defendants pay even a small premium in settlement for the risk of having to pay attorney’s fees,
the settlement is higher than it would otherwise have been in a case where no inducement was
needed to recruit the lawyer at the start.
56. Julie Davies’s conclusion, based on a more systematic inquiry, was much the same;
although the lawyers she talked to did not identify Evans as the obstacle to their practice, most
assumed that they could not make money on a good-liability/bad-damages case. See Davies,
supra note 34, at 199–200, 217–18. See also Nazer, supra note 34, at 537.
57. Before Evans, a law school clinic like mine could routinely refer good-liability/baddamages fee-shifting cases to the private bar. After Evans, as the fallout from the case became
apparent, we were unable to refer cases involving less than $100,000 in damages to the private
bar. Today the private bar views an ordinary tort case and a civil rights case the same. Without
good damages, the plaintiff will not be able to find a private lawyer to represent him (other than
very rare pro bono publico representation).
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immunity) only ups the ante,58 because it means that the lawyer might
have to litigate in two courts before a settlement offer will be
forthcoming. Any private lawyer reviewing such a case knows at once
that she cannot make money on it as a pure tort case. But Evans
means she must make the same calculation in a civil rights case: the
damages will be far below the lawyer’s projected costs and billable
hours, and the prospect of an Evans offer—granting full but modest
damages in return for a waiver or reduction of fees—will be close to
certain.
To be blunt, Evans changed the calculation of what a case is
worth. Before Evans, if the damage claim was worth $10,000 and the
attorney time was going to be, say, $40,000, then the defense thought
of the case as a $50,000 case—that was the true measure of the
defendants’ exposure. Settlement proceeded accordingly, perhaps
with the damage figure discounted for the risk of a “no cause” or a
low verdict at trial. But it was hard for defense counsel in
negotiations to discount the attorney’s fees to the same extent that
they discounted the claim on the merits, because even if the plaintiff
won only $7,000 instead of $10,000 at trial, the plaintiff’s lawyer would
still be entitled to the same $40,000 in fees.59 The only way to curtail
the attorney’s fees was to settle early, before the plaintiff’s side had
expended many billable hours.
Before Evans, the fee-shifting statute therefore had its intended
effect even in negotiation. Defense counsel had to think of the merits
claim and the fee claim in different terms, and had to discount them
differently. The defense also had a powerful incentive to settle early,
before the plaintiff’s fees mounted. After Evans, defense lawyers
stopped thinking about the value of the fee claim, because the defense
could always cut the plaintiff’s lawyer out with a good settlement
offer conditioned on the waiver of fees. In a post-Evans world, a
$10,000 claim with a seventy percent chance of success and $40,000 in
attorney’s fees yields an offer much closer to $7,000 than to $47,000,
because defense counsel no longer has to think of the attorney’s fees
as a realistic exposure. The defense also has no incentive to settle
early. To the contrary, the defense incentive after Evans is to stall

58. In a civil rights case, defendants are permitted to file an interlocutory appeal on the
issue of qualified immunity. See Mitchell v. Forsythe, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985). Such an appeal
can add 18 months and tens of thousands of dollars to the lawyer’s litigation costs.
59. See City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 575 (1986) (holding that attorney’s fees
need not be proportional to the amount of damages).
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settlement, because the higher the plaintiff’s billable hours, the more
leverage the defense has, as the plaintiff’s lawyer becomes desperate to
stem the bleeding.60
In sum, Evans allowed defense counsel to treat civil rights cases
the same as other tort cases. And once the mind-set of defense
counsel changed, the mind-set of plaintiffs’ lawyers changed as well.
They internalized the defense message, gradually learning that
without high damages they were wasting their time. The defense
would always offer a settlement the plaintiff could not refuse, but that
would leave the lawyer with little or nothing to show for her work.
Congress’s efforts to improve the market for legal services for civil
rights plaintiffs was undone by Evans, because it put civil rights cases
on the same footing as conventional tort cases, in which fee-shifting
was not available. Justice Brennan was right: even private plaintiffs’
lawyers with high ideals have to earn a living, and therefore the longterm effect of Evans should have been “embarrassingly obvious,”61
despite the majority’s protestations.62
II. EFFORTS TO CONTRACT AROUND EVANS
In the years after Evans, the Legal Services community spent
considerable conference time—and spilled a fair amount of ink—
trying to come up with an Evans-proof retainer agreement. The
problem was caused not by Evans alone but by the perceived tension
between Evans and the ethics rules.63 Rule 1.7(b) of the Model Rules
60. Moreover, if the defendants are represented by salaried lawyers from the state attorney
general’s office, the incentive to stall settlement is even stronger. The plaintiff’s costs will keep
rising with little prospect of ever being paid, while the defense costs stay flat—really at zero—
because the defense lawyers will be paid their salary by the state whether they settle the case or
not.
61. Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 759 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
62. Other commentators have noted that the real harm from fee waivers is not to the
plaintiff in the case in which the fee waiver is offered, but to the
truly unrepresented class, who are unable to obtain legal representation to bring civil
rights claims in the future. The harm is to the general public as well, which suffers not
only from lax enforcement of the civil rights laws, but also from the diminishing of the
deterrent impact of attorney’s fees by the perception that the costs of noncompliance
has been freed from the burden of [paying attorney’s fees].
Kraus, supra note 30, at 625. See also Margaret Annabel de Lisser, Note, Giving Substance to
the Bad Faith Exception of Evans v. Jeff D.: A Reconciliation of Evans with the Civil Rights
Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 553, 568 n.89 (1987).
63. See, e.g., Peter H. Woodin, Note, Fee Waivers and Civil Rights Settlement Offers: State
Ethics Prohibitions After Evans v. Jeff D., 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1214, 1230 (1987) (arguing that
even after Evans state ethics boards should have prohibited fee waiver demands, based solely
on the ethics rules).
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of Professional Conduct says: “A lawyer shall not represent a client if
the representation of that client may be materially limited . . . by the
lawyer’s own interests, unless: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes the
representation will not be adversely affected, and (2) the client
consents after consultation.”64 Additionally, Rule 1.2(a) of the Model
Rules clarifies that the client, and the client alone, has the authority to
settle a case: “A lawyer shall abide by a client’s decision whether to
accept an offer of settlement of a matter.”65
Accordingly, when defense lawyers made an Evans offer (giving
the plaintiff nearly everything on the condition that he waive or
reduce his statutory attorney’s fees), the plaintiff’s lawyer could
recommend that her client decline the offer, but the lawyer could not
66
Most lawyers and
veto the client’s decision to accept it.
commentators agreed that a retainer agreement could not overtly
take away the client’s right to accept a settlement—and give that right
to the lawyer—without violating Rule 1.2 or creating an impossible
conflict of interest under Rule 1.7.67 Creative plaintiffs’ lawyers
therefore floated several ideas to protect themselves or their public
interest law offices from Evans offers.

64. I will refer only to the Model Rules, because, since their adoption by the ABA in 1983,
they have largely supplanted the Model Code of Professional Responsibility that preceded
them. As of 2007, nearly all fifty states had replaced ethics codes based on the Model Code with
ethics codes based on the Model Rules, and the few exceptions had modified their codes to
reflect Model Rules provisions. See JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
STANDARDS, RULES & STATUTES 319 (abridged ed., 2006–2007).
65. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b) (2002).
66. One can argue that public interest plaintiffs’ lawyers cannot even recommend against
acceptance of such a settlement without creating a conflict of interest. (The Idaho Legal Aid
Society lawyer in Evans itself was a forceful and eloquent advocate for this position.) Others
have disagreed, arguing that public interest plaintiffs’ lawyers should not be in any worse
position than other plaintiffs’ lawyers, and of course private tort lawyers routinely recommend
that their clients reject settlements when the lawyers think they can make more money from the
case by taking it to trial. See Nazer, supra note 34, at 520–21; Comm. on Prof’l and Judicial
Ethics of the N.Y. City Bar Ass’n, Eth. Op. 1987-4, 5 (1987) (reversing the previous bar on fee
waivers in light of Evans, but with a strong minority report arguing that public interest plaintiffs’
lawyers should not be held to a different ethical standard than private plaintiffs’ lawyers).
67. Compare Goldstein, supra note 35, at 291–95 (arguing for coercive retainer agreements
and downplaying their ethical problems) with Nazer, supra note 34, at 519 (noting that in the
1990s bar ethics opinions from Connecticut, North Dakota, Utah, and the District of Columbia
prohibited retainer contracts that limited a client’s ability to accept a settlement offer, including
a condition that an offer must be rejected if it does not include reasonable fees or preserve the
right to seek reasonable fees). California, on the other hand, approved such a retainer contract.
See State Bar of Cal. Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Op. 1994136 (1994).
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A. The Goldstein Proposal
In 1986, Steven M. Goldstein proposed a fee contract for LSC
lawyers that prohibited the simultaneous negotiation of the merits
and the fees of a case and that required judicial review of any
68
settlement that paid less than a reasonable fee. The problem with
Goldstein’s proposal was that it could not bind the defense attorneys
who would be making the Evans offer, nor could it bind the court to
review such a settlement.69
Moreover, Goldstein’s proposal did not solve the Evans problem
because his retainer agreement was unenforceable in practice.70 If the
plaintiff accepted the Evans offer and deprived the lawyer of her
reasonable fee despite having promised not to do so, the plaintiff’s
lawyer had little recourse. The lawyer could withdraw from the case,71
but withdrawing would not get her the money she was owed (and that
she had expected to be paid by the defendants pursuant to the feeshifting law when she agreed to represent the plaintiff).72
The plaintiff’s lawyer would be left with a contract claim against
her own client. Even if she sued, she could recover only whatever
remained of the client’s small settlement—an amount that by
definition (in a good-liability/bad-damages case) would be less than
what the lawyer had spent on the case. The lawyer would have the
time and expense of a second lawsuit on her hands, against her own
uncollectible client. She would have the moral high ground but a
boatload of misery.

68. See Steven M. Goldstein, Settlement Offers Contingent Upon Waiver of Attorney Fees:
A Continuing Dilemma after Evans v. Jeff D., 20 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 692, 699–701 (Oct.
1986).
69. The fact that the plaintiff and his lawyer agreed to negotiate the issues separately, or
agreed to get the court’s approval after the fact if the lawyer were underpaid, could not control
or even influence the defense bar’s conduct or the court’s actions.
70. See id.
71. Under MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b) (2002), attorneys can only
withdraw in certain situations. Disagreement about settlement may not be enough to get out of
a case, even if the settlement results in the lawyer being paid less than she had hoped to be paid.
And once a case is filed, the lawyer may also need the judge’s permission to withdraw, which is
not always or easily forthcoming. Id.
72. The judge hearing the underlying case would be unlikely to referee a contract dispute
between the lawyer and her client. And if the lawyer tried to sue for specific performance
before the case was over, she would create a conflict that would require her to withdraw. She
cannot both represent the client and be the plaintiff in a collection action against the client at
the same time. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7, 1.9 (2007).
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B. The Yelenosky and Silver Proposal
In 1994, Stephen Yelenosky and Charles Silver took another crack
73
at the Evans problem. Their retainer agreement made the plaintiff
liable for the lawyer’s reasonable hourly fees in full, but the lawyer
agreed not to collect the debt. Instead the plaintiff assigned the fee
claim to his lawyer, so that the lawyer could use the assigned claim to
deal with the defendants.74 The client got a debt but no personal
liability; the lawyer got the fee claim but assumed the risk of loss if it
bore no fruit.
The Yelenosky and Silver retainer treated all settlement payments
as received for the benefit of the client and the lawyer, to be
75
distributed between them pursuant to an allocation formula. The
interests of the client and the lawyer were thus joined regardless of
how the defense characterized the split between damages and fees in
their settlement offer.
The sticky part of Yelenosky and Silver’s proposal was the
formula itself, which sought to yield a fair division of the funds by
linking it to the value of the damages versus the value of the fees at
76
the point when the offer was made. They came up with a formula
that had the virtues of being easy to calculate, consistent, and fair, but
its vice was that it was extraordinarily hard to explain to a client—
especially to an uneducated or unsophisticated client.77

73. See Stephen Yelenosky & Charles Silver, A Model Retainer Agreement for Legal
Services Programs: Mandatory Attorney Fee Provisions, 28 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 114 (June
1994). LSC had promulgated a model retainer agreement pursuant to 45 C.F.R. § 1611.8(a)
(1993), which required LSC offices and their clients to sign a written retainer agreement.
Yelenosky and Silver were critical of the fee provisions of the new model agreement and wrote
to offer what they thought was a better alternative. The LSC model agreement drew in part on
an agreement proposed for private civil rights lawyers. Id. See Jeff Scott Olson, A New Model
Retainer Agreement for Civil Rights Cases: Nailing Things Down on Settled Ground, in 7 CIVIL
RIGHTS LITIGATION AND ATTORNEY FEES ANNUAL HANDBOOK 391, 391–415 (Steven
Saltzman & Barbara M. Wolvovitz eds., 1991); discussion infra note 76 and accompanying text.
74. Yelenosky & Silver, supra note 73, at 118, 135–36.
75. Id. at 119–123, 131–32, 135–37.
76. See Yelenosky & Silver, supra note 73, at 119–20, 131–32. As they put it,
Because plaintiff’s right to a fee award increases defendant’s expected loss at trial, it
increases the amount a defendant will find it economically rational to pay in
settlement of the claim. . . . The size of the settlement is thus attributable partly to a
client’s entitlement to compensatory relief and partly to a client’s entitlement to a fee
award. The difficulty is in determining the portion of the payment . . . in a particular
case that is attributable to [one or the other].
Id. at 120.
77. The formula read like an algebra textbook and would have been impenetrable to most
LSC clients. See id. at 131–32.
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In addition, the client would never get less than the predicted
verdict—the amount the lawyer would expect the client to win at trial,
discounted by the odds of winning. That was the client’s floor. The
floor was needed because federal regulations barred LSC offices from
charging a fee at all unless the client was first fully compensated.78
The floor may have been required by federal law, but that
exception gave skilled defense counsel all the opening needed to
force an Evans settlement. If defense counsel could assess that
number and offer it, the client should accept the offer, effectively
79
cutting the lawyer out of any fee. Accordingly, the Yelenosky and
Silver contract could not prevent or counteract Evans offers in most
cases, because federal regulations required the client to be fully
80
compensated before the lawyer could exact her fee.
Moreover, even without the LSC requirement of a “full
compensation” floor, the Yelenosky and Silver proposal did little to
ward off Evans offers in cases where a defense to the Evans offer was
most necessary—cases where the lawyers’ fees were high but the
client’s damages were low. In that situation, once the split favored the
lawyer, there would be little incentive for the client to reject an early
low offer, because over time the lawyer’s share would only increase
(as the lawyer put more time into the case), while the client’s share
would remain fixed by the static nature of his damages. With the
formula’s constant numerator and escalating denominator, the
plaintiff would need a much higher offer down the road to improve

78. At the time, Legal Services Offices labored under a constraint imposed by federal law
that programs could not charge clients for their services and could retain moneys as fees only
when the fees would not reduce the amount of damages or other relief awarded to the client.
Yelenosky & Silver, supra note 73, at 120 n.20 (citing 45 C.F.R. §§ 1609.5, 1609.6 (1993);
interpretive letters from the LSC General Counsel’s Office).
79. For example, if the predicted verdict was $10,000 with a fifty percent chance of winning,
the defense would only have to offer $5,000. The client would have no reason not to take it, and
the lawyer would get nothing.
80. Another weakness of the proposal was that it required the lawyer to set two different
variables in the formula: (1) the predicted verdict, expressed as a dollar figure; and (2) the odds
of winning, expressed as a percentage. Both variables could have a huge effect on the resulting
fees versus damages calculation. As the authors acknowledged, neither variable could be set
with any accuracy at the start of the case, but late in the case the lawyer would have a powerful
self-interest in setting the variables to her own advantage. The formula thus created a risk that
the calculation of the split would be slanted against the client and in favor of the lawyer. In the
end Yelenosky and Silver conceded that the client would have to rely on the good faith of the
lawyer, as is true in most lawyer-client dealings. Given that Legal Aid lawyers are a selfselecting altruistic lot, and that any attorney’s fees go to the program and not to the individual
lawyer, Yelenosky and Silver thought the risk of a skewed formula was acceptably low.
Yelenosky & Silver, supra note 73, at 126–27.
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his position. The defense would thus still be able to get out of the case
cheaply and mostly to the detriment of the plaintiff’s counsel.
The Yelenosky and Silver retainer agreement was little tested for
two reasons. First, it was so complicated that few LSC lawyers were
willing to subject their clients to it. Second, as noted above, by 1996
LSC-funded offices were barred from handling fee-generating cases
81
entirely. As a result, the problem of how to counteract the effect of
Evans reverted to the private plaintiffs’ bar, which until Evans had
routinely and enthusiastically accepted good-liability/bad-damages
cases under section 1983.
C. The Olson Proposal
Yelenosky and Silver had based their contract in part on a model
retainer agreement drafted by a private civil rights lawyer in
Wisconsin, Jeff Scott Olson.82 Like Yelenosky and Silver’s contract,
Olson’s model agreement treated any money received as a lump sum
83
for the benefit of the client and the lawyer. But the Olson contract
also contained several other provisions designed to prevent defense
counsel from being able to make effective Evans offers. First, it
assigned the fee claim to the lawyer so that the lawyer could pursue
collection on her own behalf if necessary. Second, it gave the
plaintiff’s lawyer a lien on any funds received, to guarantee that the
lawyer would be able to deduct her fee from the settlement.84 Third, it
gave the lawyer the right to withdraw from the case if the client made
a “fiscally unreasonable decision” with regard to settlement, while
protecting the lawyer’s right to be paid by the client for all work done
up to the point of withdrawal.85 Finally, the contract’s hourly rate
included a steep contingency enhancement.86

81. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
82. See Jeff Scott Olson, Protection, Persuasion and Proof: Toward a Model Civil Rights
Retainer Agreement for the 90s, in 3 CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION AND ATTORNEY FEES ANNUAL
HANDBOOK 371, 371–81 (Clark Boardman, Co. 1987). Olsen later modified his model
agreement to streamline it and to resolve some of the peripheral issues that had not been
addressed in the first draft. See Olson, supra note 73.
83. Olson credits the idea of “lumping” the damages and the attorney’s fees to an ethics
opinion that was issued after Evans came down. Olson, supra note 73, at 399–400 (citing New
Mexico Bar Association Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 1985-3 (1985)).
84. Id. at 401–02, 408.
85. Id. at 405.
86. The contingency enhancement was included to account for the risk, over a series of
these cases, that more often than not the lawyer would be underpaid for her services, so that the
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Olson’s contract, unlike Yelenosky and Silver’s, did not have a
floor that guaranteed the client any level of recovery, because none
was compelled.87 Thus, under Olson’s agreement, the lawyer’s fee
could consume the entire settlement fund. Indeed, in goodliability/bad-damages cases, the lawyer’s fee would nearly always do
just that. The client’s only recourse would be to refuse to settle, thus
forcing the lawyer either to renegotiate the split or to take the case to
trial against the lawyer’s wishes.88
Olson understood that in a post-Evans world, what the plaintiffs’
bar needed was not a remedial hammer for the client’s breach of the
retainer agreement, but a built-in financial “lock” that would preclude
the client from accepting an Evans offer in the first place. The Olson
contract averted Evans offers by the simple expedient of making the
client liable for the full amount of the attorney’s fees if the client tried
89
to cut the lawyer out. At bottom, the Olson contract created an
overwhelming economic incentive for the client always to do what his
lawyer wanted him to do. The client had no choice but to reject any
offer that did not pay the lawyer a reasonable fee for the time she had
invested in the case.
The Olson scheme had obvious objections. First, the fee contract
90
itself undermined the purpose of fee-shifting laws. The purpose of
such laws is not just to find lawyers for plaintiffs with modest damages
(or to deter unwanted conduct), but also to make injured plaintiffs
whole. A scheme that benefits plaintiffs’ lawyers at the expense of
91
their clients undercuts that goal. Second, plaintiffs’ lawyers might
justifiably fear that the Olson contract violated state ethics rules on
unreasonable fees. In looking at the reasonableness of a fee, a bar

“normal market rate” was not a true measure of the lawyer’s costs over time. Id. at 397–98, 407,
413.
87. See id. at 400–01.
88. One could argue that the real point of the Olson contract was to force plaintiffs to go to
trial in all good-liability/bad-damages cases, so that their lawyers would get paid by full-fee
awards post-verdict, and not via settlement. But few private plaintiffs’ counsel have the energy
or resources to keep a practice alive in which every case must go to trial in order for the lawyer
to be paid. The result would be no different than under the Evans regime: plaintiffs’ lawyers
would soon shun the good-liability/bad-damages cases.
89. See Olson, supra note 73, at 401, 407–08.
90. This objection was flagged by Goldstein, supra note 68, at 694 n.8.
91. No doubt Olson believed that the choice after Evans was either no lawyers to represent
civil rights plaintiffs (in good-liability/bad-damages cases) or lawyers who could coerce their
clients into rejecting settlements that would deprive the lawyers of reasonable fees. For Olson,
the fault lay with the Court’s decision in Evans and what logically flowed from it, not with the
plaintiffs’ bar.
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grievance commission typically does not make its determination in a
vacuum, based only on the time and effort the lawyer has expended.92
Rather, it makes its determination in context, including the amount
recovered by the plaintiff, or other measures of the success of the
litigation. If the fee contract is structured so that, in goodliability/bad-damages cases, the client is certain to come away with
very little, and the lawyer is certain to come away with a lot, the
lawyer might reasonably fear disciplinary action for charging
excessive fees.93
D. Reading the Market
One might think that the Olson contract—with its one-sided
protections for plaintiffs’ counsel—would have resolved the Evans
problem and kept private plaintiffs’ lawyers as eager to litigate goodliability/bad-damages cases after Evans as they had been before. But
that did not happen.
The plaintiffs’ bar’s lack of faith in—or distaste for—an Evansproof retainer is best borne out by the market response to Evans.
Plaintiffs’ lawyers did not keep taking good-liability/bad-damages
cases assuming that they could contract their way around the Evans
problem.94 To the contrary, they stopped taking the cases because
they had no choice. A straight contingent fee was out of the question.
If plaintiffs’ lawyers used the Yelenosky and Silver contract, they
would still get burned because smart defendants would offer, and
smart plaintiffs would accept, early low settlements, and the lawyers
would be cut out or underpaid. And if plaintiffs’ lawyers went with an
Olson-style contract, they would wind up with most or all of the

92. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5 (2006). This is true even in the
context of criminal cases, where there is no possibility of monetary recovery. See, e.g., In re
Kutner, 399 N.E.2d 963 (Ill. 1979); In re Fordham, 668 N.E.2d 816 (Mass. 1996).
93. The Olson model fee contract increased the risk of a Rule 1.2(a) violation because it
included a “springing” contingency fee; at the end of the case the lawyer could elect either the
agreed-upon hourly rate or a contingent fee, whichever was higher. That way the lawyer would
be sure to get a share of any jackpot if the case produced an unexpectedly high verdict or
settlement. See also Philadelphia Bar Assoc’n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 2001-1 (2002)
(holding that a contract that punishes a client financially for settling when the lawyer wishes not
to settle or for not settling when the lawyer wishes to settle usurps the client’s exclusive right to
make the decision on settlement).
94. As Justice Brennan noted in Evans, “Of course, none of the parties has seriously
suggested that civil rights attorneys can protect themselves through private arrangements. After
all, Congress enacted the Fees Act because, after Alyeska, it found such arrangements wholly
inadequate.” Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 757 n.10 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

01__REINGOLD_FINAL.DOC

2008]

7/23/2008 9:32:30 AM

REQUIEM FOR SECTION 1983

29

settlement money, but with very unhappy clients; or they would have
to try every case. They might also face ethics charges, because in any
good-liability/bad-damages cases that settled, the lawyers should have
known at the start that they would get nearly everything and that the
clients would get almost nothing.
The dried-up market strongly suggests that contract-cures for the
Evans problem were unreliable or unsavory enough that few lawyers
95
wanted to use them. The result was that section 1988 became a dead
letter for the one category of cases it was intended to induce private
lawyers to take—good-liability/bad-damages cases. In the years after
Evans, apart from the rare pro bono case, private lawyers simply
stopped handling good-liability/bad-damages cases.
The only lawyers left who could afford to handle such cases were
salaried lawyers who did not have to rely on attorney’s fees for their
livelihood. But lawyers who work for public interest law offices with
independent funding normally do not handle individual civil rights
actions, because the agencies they work for focus on larger social or
political issues.96 Their legal work typically takes the form of class
actions challenging unconstitutional state laws or policies in cases
seeking equitable relief.
III. THE PROBLEM OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Many good-liability/bad-damages cases are, like Evans itself, not
damages cases at all. Rather, the plaintiffs seek injunctive relief in the
form of a change of governmental policy.97 In these cases, the state
defendants have great leverage. As in Evans, they can offer broad
and flexible relief in return for a waiver or reduction of attorney’s
fees.98
95. The issue disappeared from the LSC literature after 1996, when LSC field offices were
prohibited from seeking attorney’s fees. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
96. To the extent that non-profit legal service providers handle individual civil rights
damages claims, the dynamics of settlement under Evans are the same as described above. The
difference is that a non-profit law office can much more easily agree to a reduced fee because
the lawyers do not need the fees to put food on the table. If the health of the agency is
jeopardized by a lack of funding, however, then one would expect to see the same thing seen in
the private sector: movement away from cases with low or modest damages. See, e.g., Nazer,
supra note 34, at 535–38.
97. In the following sections, I will refer to the plaintiffs in the plural, because in most
injunctive-relief cases the plaintiffs are a class or the caption includes several individual named
plaintiffs.
98. Often the costs to the state can be absorbed in ways that are difficult to measure in a
vast state budget but that require little immediate outlay of hard dollars.
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The bulk of such injunctive civil rights work was always done by
salaried lawyers, typically at publicly funded Legal Aid offices or at
membership-funded organizations like the ACLU or the NAACP
99
Legal Defense Fund. Before Evans, however, many private, forprofit plaintiffs’ firms took these cases as well; in fact some firms
specialized in them. The cases could generate lots of billable hours
because, like Evans, they tended to be complex and long-lived.
Private plaintiffs’ lawyers could thus afford to do the work, knowing
that if they won or settled they would be paid for all their hours at
prevailing market rates. The financial reward could be very high, in
addition to the moral reward of forcing the government to obey the
law.
Evans drove these firms out of the civil rights legal market, too.
The specialty firms could no longer serve as “private attorneys
general” to bring injunctive-relief cases, because, like the LSC lawyers
in Evans, in the end they would not be paid for their time and effort.
Evans thus destroyed the private bar’s important supplementary role
in these cases. In sum, while Evans did not completely drain the pool
of available lawyers handling injunctive civil rights cases (as it did
with low-damages civil rights actions), it greatly reduced the pool by
siphoning off the private bar.
The harm, though less pronounced, was still very real. LSC had
offices in all fifty states. But with LSC lawyers barred from handling
class actions after 1996,100 and with private firms out of the civil rights
business, plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief were left only with nonprofit legal agencies. But such agencies are not easy to find. Many
states, especially rural states, have few or none. Therefore, unless the
plaintiffs are in a big city, and unless they can find an agency that
specializes in their type of claim, no lawyer will be available. For
purposes of challenging unconstitutional state action, the result is
what economists would call a “distribution failure.”

99. The legal arms of these agencies, together with their sponsoring organizations, can
assert considerable influence over state law and policy, both through their lobbying efforts and
through litigation. For example, the ACLU in California has challenged a host of state laws,
policies, and referenda having to do with schools, medical care, welfare, prisons, etc.
100. LSC lawyers could still bring civil rights cases seeking injunctive relief on behalf of an
individual client. But such cases are more susceptible to dismissal on grounds of mootness. The
defendants can offer relief to the individual plaintiff without changing the underlying policy.
Also, because LSC lawyers are banned from receiving attorney’s fees, there is no added
financial risk to the defendants of taking the case to trial or delaying settlement as long as
possible.
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In contrast, the “private attorneys general” who were drawn to
civil rights cases by the Fees Act were not geographically limited—
they were everywhere. Until Evans, the Fees Act created the same
useful incentive wherever lawyers practiced law and wherever states
infringed upon the constitutional rights of their residents. Evans thus
not only dried up the legal market for civil rights plaintiffs with
meritorious claims but low damages; it also gutted the corps of
“private attorneys general” who had served as a useful check on
unconstitutional state laws and policies.101
IV. TROUBLE SINCE EVANS
A. The Buckhannon Problem
Since Evans, things have gotten worse for the private plaintiffs’
bar. Under section 1988, to be eligible for a fee award plaintiffs must
be “prevailing parties.”102 Until 2001, the “catalyst theory” of feeshifting held that plaintiffs were eligible for attorney’s fees if their
lawsuit provoked the change they sought in their complaint. That is,
defendants could not avoid liability for fees by capitulating at the last
minute. The courts deemed the plaintiffs to be prevailing parties
regardless of whether their lawsuit was resolved by a judgment, by a
settlement, or even by the unilateral action of the defendants.103 The
catalyst theory had been endorsed by every federal court of appeals

101. The private attorneys general model had also created within the private bar centers of
expertise and networks of collaboration that would not otherwise have existed. Evans
destroyed these resources, too, when it drove private lawyers out of the civil rights business.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2007).
103. See, e.g., Paris v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 988 F.2d 236, 241–42 (1st Cir.
1993); Zinn v. Shalala, 35 F.3d 273, 274–76 (7th Cir. 1994); Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski
County Special Dist. No. 1, 17 F.3d 260, 262–63 (8th Cir. 1994); Stivers v. Pierce, 71 F.3d 732,
751–53 (9th Cir. 1995). At one point, twelve of the thirteen circuits to have considered the issue
had adopted the catalyst theory. See Deford, supra note 3, at 313 (citing Buckhannon Bd. &
Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 626 n.4 (2001)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting)). Most of the cases relied on dicta from Hewitt v. Helms, in which
Justice Scalia wrote:
It is settled law, of course, that relief need not be judicially decreed in order to justify
a fee award under § 1988. A lawsuit sometimes produces voluntary action by the
defendant that affords the plaintiff all or some of the relief he sought through a
judgment—e.g., a monetary settlement or a change in conduct that redresses the
plaintiff’s grievances. When that occurs, the plaintiff is deemed to have prevailed
despite the absence of a formal judgment in his favor.
482 U.S. 755, 760–61 (1987). Hewitt was the logical extension of Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122,
129 (1980), which rejected defense arguments that to be a “prevailing party” a plaintiff must go
to trial.
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to have considered the issue except the Fourth Circuit, which had
disapproved it en banc by a single vote.104 In Buckhannon Board and
Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human
105
Resources, however, the Supreme Court renounced the catalyst
theory. It said that to be a prevailing party eligible for a fee award
under a fee-shifting statute, a plaintiff had to win a contested
judgment, a consent judgment, or a settlement subject to some
ongoing court supervision or judicial approval.106 After Buckhannon,
simply provoking the defendants to change their position—even as a
direct result of the litigation—no longer entitled plaintiffs to
prevailing party status under federal law.107
Many catalyst theory cases involved a demand for policy changes
or other injunctive relief beyond the direct control of the named
defendants. Buckhannon itself was typical. The plaintiffs complained
that a state administrative rule violated due process as applied to
them. While the case was pending, the state legislature quietly
amended the rule, deleting the offending section.108 The change
effectively mooted the case, since the plaintiffs got all the relief sought
in their lawsuit. The Court held that they were ineligible for any
attorney’s fees, for lack of a judgment or comparable judicial relief.109
Buckhannon created one more defense to the payment of
110
and it reduced the
attorney’s fees to successful plaintiffs,
defendants’ risk that they would have to pay fees, whether they caved
in to the plaintiffs’ demands or orchestrated the change of policy
outside of the settlement process. In Buckhannon, as in Evans, the

104. See S-1 & S-2 v. State Bd. of Educ. of N.C., 21 F.3d 49, 51–52 (4th Cir. 1994) (en banc),
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 876 (1994).
105. 532 U.S. 598 (2001).
106. Id. at 600–10.
107. In practice the catalyst theory had provided a safety net for plaintiffs’ lawyers who
might otherwise have been deprived of their fees. That is, until Buckhannon, if the favorable
change occurred outside the settlement process, the plaintiffs could still file a fee petition, and
under the catalyst theory they had a good shot at being awarded fees by the court.
108. Presumably the named defendants lacked the power to make the change themselves,
else—one must assume—they would have negotiated the change, conditioning it on the waiver
of the plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees, à la Evans.
109. Id. at 600–06.
110. The added harm caused by Buckhannon is hard to measure. It may have been modest,
given that by 2001 so few private lawyers were handling injunctive civil rights actions anyway,
other than on a pro bono basis. Also, if both sides want to settle, even after Buckhannon it is
possible to sign an agreement that includes attorney’s fees, regardless of whether the plaintiff
class could attain “prevailing party” status for lack of a judgment or its equivalent. See Deford,
supra note 3, at 322.
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plaintiffs won everything they wanted, while their lawyers gained
nothing for their work, which included an appeal all the way to the
Supreme Court.111
Buckhannon creates perverse incentives of its own. It encourages
plaintiffs to rush to summary judgment as quickly as possible, before
the defendants can change their illegal conduct or policies sufficient
to moot the case. And it encourages defendants to act in bad faith,
litigating with vigor until the court signals in some way that they are
likely to lose and then capitulating quickly and completely so as to
avoid a fee award. Like Evans, it rewards defendants who postpone
settlement negotiations until the plaintiffs’ attorneys have run up
their hours (at least in cases where judicial oversight is unnecessary
for the plaintiffs to get the relief they seek). Buckhannon also
encourages the defense to make Evans offers in the form of contracts
rather than orders or consent decrees, to avoid court supervision of
settlements that in the past would have been subject to judicial
monitoring.
As a result, the parties, the courts, and the public have lost: (1) the
careful, deliberate, and thorough litigation of constitutional issues; (2)
negotiated settlements designed to solve present and future problems;
(3) early settlements that reduce dockets; (4) court supervision of
settlements in some cases where supervision would be appropriate;
and (5) “private attorneys general” willing to accept civil rights
cases.112 At bottom, Buckhannon provides one more reason for
private plaintiffs’ lawyers to turn down civil rights cases, further
undermining section 1983 as a remedy for plaintiffs seeking equitable
relief.113

111. In dissent, Justice Ginsburg noted that the case would “impede access to the court for
the less well heeled, and shrink the incentive Congress created for the enforcement of federal
law by private attorneys general.” Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 623 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). She
wrote that “Congress enacted § 1988 to ensure that nonaffluent plaintiffs would have ‘effective
access’ to the Nation’s courts to enforce civil rights laws.” Id. at 636. The plaintiffs’ lawyers in
Buckhannon lost some $200,000 in billable hours in the case, despite having succeeded in getting
the regulation withdrawn.
112. See Jean R. Sternlight, The Supreme Court’s Denial of Reasonable Attorney’s Fees to
Prevailing Civil Rights Plaintiffs, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 535, 607 (1989/1990)
(noting that civil rights lawyers “rarely, if ever . . . recover a fully compensatory fee. As a result,
those who formerly specialized in civil rights law are now abandoning the practice in droves”
and citing cases documenting the difficulty of finding lawyers in civil rights cases). Id. at 538,
539 n.9.
113. After Buckhannon was decided, there were high expectations that Congress would
swiftly overturn it through amended legislation. This had occurred twice in the previous decade,
when the Supreme Court held in Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1020–21 (1984), that
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B. Limitations on Fee Waivers by Defendants
Evans left open the question whether a demand for a fee waiver
might ever be forbidden. On this point, the Court’s discussion was
brief. Justice Stevens noted that a district court need not “place its
stamp of approval on every settlement in which the plaintiffs’
114
attorneys have agreed to a fee waiver.” In other words, when and if
defense counsel exceed the limit on their conduct, the district court
can always police them. But how are the defendants, the plaintiffs, or
the courts to know when such a limit has been reached?
In Evans the Court suggested three examples, treating them not as
ethical constraints but as conduct that could undermine the purposes
of the Fees Act and therefore might justify action by a district court.
The Court said first that a settlement offer conditioned on the waiver
of attorney’s fees might be inappropriate if the defendants “had no
115
realistic defense on the merits.” But this scenario makes little sense:
if the defendants truly had no realistic defense, any Evans offer would
be ineffective. The plaintiffs would reject it out of hand. They would
simply file a motion for summary judgment, win, and collect
attorney’s fees as awarded by the court.116 Indeed, in no published
case from 1986 to today has a court thrown out an Evans offer on the

attorney’s fees were not recoverable under the Education of the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. §§
1400–1400(d)(4), which Congress overturned in the Handicapped Children’s Protection Act, 20
U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (1986), and after West Virginia University Hospital, Inc. v. Casey, 499
U.S. 83 (1991), which barred the recovery of expert witness fees, and which Congress
overturned by amending Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1991). Some
state bar associations even went so far as to pass resolutions urging Congress to overturn
Buckhannon. See, e.g., Marilyn A. Mahursky, Joseph A. Reinert & O. Whitman Smith, Erosion
of Civil Rights Enforcement: Judicial Constriction of the Civil Rights and Disability Law Bar, 28
VT. B. J. & L. DIG. 41, 42 (June 2002). But the pessimists of the plaintiffs’ bar turned out to be
right, as Congress has not acted. See Robin Stanley, Note, Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home,
Inc. v. West Virginia Dep’t of Health and Human Res.: To the Prevailing Party Goes the Spoils .
. . and the Attorney’s Fees, 36 AKRON L. REV. 363, 408 n.230 (2003) (citing Marcia Coyle, Fee
Change is a Sea-Change But Some Seek Way to Skirt Justices’ Limitation on Catalyst Theory
Fees, NAT’L L.J., June 11, 2001, at A1 (reporting skepticism among civil rights lawyers that
Congress would act to overturn the case)).
114. Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 739 (1986).
115. Id. at 740.
116. This example also does not square with the majority’s logic. If attorney’s fees are just
another commodity that can be traded to get a better deal or to promote settlement, then it is
not clear why the relative strength of the defendants’ legal position should matter. The weaker
the case, the more likely the defense lawyers are to negotiate, so why take away the defendants’
best bargaining chip (the fee waiver) in cases where they are most handicapped by a thin
defense?
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grounds that the defendants’ legal position was so weak that the offer
undermined the policies of the Fees Act.
The Court also offered two other examples that addressed the
dissent’s concerns. A fee waiver might be impermissible (1) if the
demand were part of a “systematic practice” by the state never to pay
fees; or (2) if the demand were a “vindictive effort . . . to teach
117
[plaintiffs’] counsel that they had better not bring such cases.” In
Evans, neither example had legs because the Court was persuaded
that:
[T]he record in this case does not indicate that Idaho has adopted
such a [systematic] . . . policy, or practice. Nor does the record
support the narrower proposition that [the state’s] request to
waive fees was a vindictive effort to deter attorneys from
representing plaintiffs in civil rights suits against Idaho . . . , [or to
implement] a routine state policy designed to frustrate the
118
objectives of the Fees Act.

In dissent, Justice Brennan did not buy the proposition that
judicial enforcement would occur in these situations. (It turns out he
was more prescient on this issue as well.) He foresaw that once fee
waivers had the approval of the Court, they would become de rigueur
in any practice where they would be effective.119 Brennan understood
that plaintiffs would be hard-pressed to challenge them, given the
120
rationale for the Evans opinion. In fact, after Evans, the state bar
ethics boards that had previously barred fee waivers or simultaneous
negotiation of merits and fees immediately changed their opinions to
permit such bargaining.121 Once Evans offers had the approval of the

117. Evans, 475 U.S. at 739–40 (citing Transcript of Oral Argument at 22, Evans, 475 U.S.
717 (No. 84-1288)). It is hard to see what other message an Evans offer could possibly send,
absent some special circumstance unique to the case. An argument over the amount of the fees
might plausibly be connected to the terms of the negotiation, but a demand for a total fee
waiver can have only one effect on lawyers bringing civil rights cases: to drive them away. The
Court was unclear as to whether it was concerned with the illicit motive of the defendants, or
with the effects of the practice of conditioning settlement on the waiver of fees.
118. Id. at 740.
119. Id. at 757–58 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
120. If attorney’s fees are just one of an “arsenal of remedies” that can be freely negotiated
away, id. at 732, then plaintiffs will always have a high burden to show that the defendants are
acting systematically or vindictively—as opposed to simply bargaining hard every time. Justice
Brennan made the same point in dissent, noting that the Solicitor General all but conceded that
the United States would routinely seek fee waivers in the future. Id. at 758 n.12.
121. See, e.g., Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial Ethics of the N.Y. City Bar Ass’n, Op. 1987-4
(1987).

01__REINGOLD_FINAL.DOC

36

7/23/2008 9:32:30 AM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 3:1

Court and the state bar ethics boards, little room was left for district
court judges to say that any particular Evans offer was impermissible.
In practice, the two examples suggested by the Court—that fee
waivers might undermine the Fees Act if done “systematically” or out
122
of “vindictiveness”—have been unavailing. In the late 1980s, a few
lawyers tried to use these exceptions to get Evans offers overturned.
123
These lawyers were unsuccessful. In Willard v. City of Los Angeles
124
and Panola Land Buying Association v. Clark, the courts counseled
a hands-off approach. The Willard court said that in an individual
damages action, unlike in a class action, the court had no duty
whatsoever to scrutinize the settlement.125 The Panola court said that
once a case settles, “the court need not and should not get
126
Moreover, both courts found that the lawyer lacked
involved.”
standing to pursue the fee claim because the claim belonged
exclusively to the client.127
Since Willard and Panola, claims of defense violations of the Fees
Act have been almost non-existent.128 No federal court has struck
122. See, e.g., Note, Fee as the Wind Blows: Waivers of Attorney’s Fees in Individual Civil
Rights Actions Since Evans v. Jeff D., 102 HARV. L. REV. 1278, 1284 (1989); de Lisser, supra
note 62, at 574 (both arguing that courts should enforce the Evans “bad faith” exceptions, but
noting that no court has shown an inclination to do so). As a practical matter, Evans offers are
now routinely made by defense counsel without any risk that a district or appellate court will
find fault with them.
123. 803 F.2d 526 (9th Cir. 1986).
124. 844 F.2d 1506 (11th Cir. 1988).
125. Willard, 803 F.2d at 527–28.
126. Panola, 844 F.2d at 1508. One commentator has argued that these two decisions
“eviscerate judicial review” of Evans offers, noting that only one in a hundred civil rights cases
is a class action in which settlement must be approved by the court. Note, Fee as the Wind
Blows: Waivers of Attorney’s Fees in Individual Civil Rights Actions Since Evans v. Jeff D., supra
note 122, at 1287.
127. The problem, of course, is that the lawyer would only be seeking the court’s help
because the client had accepted an offer that deprived the lawyer of her fees and had refused to
cooperate in challenging the offer. Standing will operate as a procedural bar in nearly every
such case if the lawyer cannot raise the fee issue without the client’s cooperation. Nor is it clear
how the plaintiff would ever compile a record to support a claim of the systemic or vindictive
use of Evans offers in a case. To do so would require discovery, at a point where the case is
essentially over. Note, Fee as the Wind Blows: Waiver of Attorney’s Fees in Individual Civil
Rights Actions Since Evans v. Jeff D., supra note 122, at 1283 (noting that problems of proof
would doom such an effort). See also Goldstein, supra note 35, at 283.
128. The lack of litigation on the issue is unsurprising—especially after Willard and
Panola—for who would bring such a claim? If the plaintiff accepts the Evans offer, the lawyer is
left on her own, with no standing. If the plaintiff accepts the offer but still agrees to cooperate
with the lawyer in her quest for fees, the plaintiff risks losing the offer, because under Evans the
district court cannot undo the fee agreement but still enforce the settlement on the merits. And
if the plaintiff rejects the Evans offer, but wants to challenge the fact that the defense made the
offer, the district court can simply duck the issue, as the court did in Panola.
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down an Evans offer on the grounds of impermissible “systematic”
abuse or “vindictiveness.”129 One case, though, bears comment. In
Bernhardt v. Los Angeles County,130 an allegedly pro se plaintiff131 filed
suit, complaining that the defendants’ blanket policy of demanding
fee waivers undermined the Fees Act in violation of the Supremacy
Clause. She argued that the policy had the long-term effect of
preventing her from finding any private civil rights lawyer willing to
take her case.132 The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s
dismissal of her complaint and granted her a limited preliminary
injunction, barring the County from making a settlement “that
inhibits, interferes with, or prohibits her counsel from applying for
attorney’s fees under [section 1988].”133 On remand, the district court
dismissed the case, despite the plaintiff’s lawyer’s ardent efforts to
prove that a civil rights plaintiff with a low-damages case could not
find a private lawyer to represent her in all of Los Angeles County.134
What is most striking about Bernhardt is that it cites no other case
(apart from Willard, decided seventeen years earlier) from any
jurisdiction raising the Evans exceptions.135 The Evans offer has
become an accepted practice in civil rights litigation, exactly as Justice

129. One rare exception is Coleman v. Fiore Bros., Inc., 552 A.2d 141 (N.J. 1989), where the
court held that, for public policy reasons, thenceforth in New Jersey parties must settle the
merits of state consumer fraud act cases before the negotiation of statutory claims for fees—but
only in cases where the plaintiffs are represented by non-profit public interest lawyers. The
court prohibited Evans offers in that limited situation. Similarly, in Johnson v. District of
Columbia, 190 F. Supp. 2d 34, 42–46 (D.D.C. 2002), the court distinguished the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004), from
section 1988, and found that allegations of “a consistent policy and practice of requiring fee
waivers” or “an intentional or vindictive attempt to prevent plaintiffs . . . from recovering fees”
could violate the fee provisions of the IDEA.
130. 339 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 2003).
131. The Court of Appeals seemed appropriately skeptical that the pro se plaintiff was in
fact bringing the case on her own. Reading between the lines, it appears that private plaintiffs’
lawyers were behind the case and were doing all the legal work, in an effort to circumvent the
procedural and substantive hurdles that prevented them from raising the issue in their own
cases, at the point when the Evans offer was made. Id. at 924.
132. In an earlier appeal the court had held that even if the plaintiff could not prove actual
damages, she “still may be entitled to nominal damages on the basis that the County’s policy
interfered with her implied federal right to obtain counsel in a civil rights action.” Id. at 872.
133. Id. at 932.
134. See Bernhardt v. Los Angeles County, 101 Fed. App’x 244 (9th Cir. June 17, 2004);
Appellant’s Opening Brief, Bernhardt v. Los Angeles County, 101 Fed. App’x 244 (9th Cir.
June 17, 2004) (No. 04-55385), 2004 WL 1125747.
135. The most likely reason why there has been no litigation on this issue is that there are no
litigators: the private plaintiffs’ lawyers who would profit from such a claim no longer handle the
cases in which the claim would need to be brought. See, e.g., Sternlight, supra note 112, at 539,
607 (arguing that private for-profit plaintiffs civil rights lawyers are a vanishing breed).

01__REINGOLD_FINAL.DOC

38

7/23/2008 9:32:30 AM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 3:1

Brennan predicted. Smart defendants demand a fee waiver or fee
reduction. Smart plaintiffs almost always accept the offer, leaving
their lawyer with little or no fee and with no incentive ever to bring a
low-damages or injunctive-relief civil rights action again. The
limitations on defense conduct suggested by the majority in Evans
have proven to be illusory. At this point, Evans offers are beyond
challenge due to procedural bars or practical obstacles, or because no
private plaintiffs’ lawyers are handling the cases in which such a
challenge would be made.136 The one avenue left open in Evans (that
might have brought “private attorneys general” back to their forsaken
civil rights practices) has proven to be a dead end.
C. A Note on the Data
I have reported the death of section 1983 (for plaintiffs with lowdamages cases and for plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief) based on
my own experience trying to refer people to the private bar, and
based on what is common knowledge within the plaintiffs’ bar.137 But
tracing the death of section 1983 for these plaintiffs statistically is
problematic. The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts tracks the
number of civil cases and civil rights cases filed in the federal district
courts each year.138 The Office further breaks down civil rights cases

136. The unique exception is Bernhardt, which required two trips to the Ninth Circuit to get
a limited injunction barring an Evans offer in a single case for a claim that was ultimately
rejected and affirmed on appeal. The plaintiff’s attorney presumably recovered no fee for his
three trips to the Ninth Circuit.
137. If you have doubts about the validity of my experience or the common knowledge of
the plaintiffs’ bar, take this challenge: make up a good-liability/bad-damages or injunctive relief
civil rights case, and go shopping for a lawyer. You will get lots of free or reduced-fee initial
intake interviews, and you will visit a host of small law offices. The good lawyers will tell you
the truth—that you have a valid claim but that no good lawyer will ever take it, because she
cannot make money on the case. The bad lawyers will hem and haw before saying no, or they
will refer you down the food chain. Eventually you may find a new or desperate lawyer who will
say yes, but probably not. Even if you do, you will one day regret it: the lawyer will not be up to
the task of handling a civil rights action, or, more likely, as her hours and costs exceed any
possible recovery, she will desperately try to get rid of your case. Good lawyers know that
without a fee-shifting law that operates as Congress intended, they cannot make money on these
cases.
138. See Chart, attached as the Appendix. The chart is a compilation of the data supplied by
the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts annually (or in five-year increments) from 1975 to
2006. See DIRECTOR OF THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1975–2006 ANNUAL
REPORTS OF THE DIRECTOR, tbls. C-2 and/or C-2A, Civil Cases Commenced by Basis of
Jurisdiction and Nature of Suit (1976–2006) (collected and reported by calendar year), 1997–
2006 reports, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbususc/judbus.html. See also OFFICE OF
JUDGES PROGRAM, STATISTICS DIV., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1975–2006
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into five subcategories, namely voting cases, employment cases,
welfare cases, housing cases, and other cases.139 (Prisoners’ civil rights
cases are counted separately.)140
The government’s data are unhelpful for evaluating the effects of
Evans for several reasons. First, they do not track whether the cases
were filed pro se or with a lawyer. We therefore cannot measure
changes in the levels of representation as a result of Evans (or any
other cases or statutory amendments making civil rights practice more
or less attractive to the private plaintiffs’ bar). Second, the data do
not track whether the cases involved low, medium, or high damages,141
or if the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief. We therefore cannot chart
changes in the levels of representation relative to the amount or type
142
of relief sought.
Third, in three of the four subcategories of civil rights cases—
voting, welfare, and housing—the numbers are so low as to be
statistically insignificant. Those three subcategories account for only
about .03 percent of all civil rights cases—a figure that has been
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS (collected and reported by calendar year), 2001–
2007 reports, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/caseloadstatistics.html.
139. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1975–2006 ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE
DIRECTOR, tbls. C-2 and/or C-2A, CIVIL CASES COMMENCED BY BASIS OF JURISDICTION AND
NATURE OF SUIT (1976–2007) (collected and reported by calendar year). The data come from
the mandatory cover sheets that must be filed with every federal district court complaint. The
statistics are thus based on self-reporting of the most limited kind, taken from what the plaintiff
(if pro se) or the plaintiff’s lawyer writes on the cover sheet form.
140. The issue of prisoners’ rights cases is beyond the scope of this Article. Evans and
Buckhannon had the same effect on prisoners’ rights cases that they had on every other civil
rights practice area, the main difference being that so few lawyers were willing to take prisoners’
rights cases even before Evans. If there were any private lawyers still handling low-damages or
injunctive-relief prisoners’ rights cases after Evans, Congress put them out of business in 1996.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801–810, 110 Stat. 1321,
1321-66 to -77 (1996) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 523; 18 U.S.C. §§ 3624, 3626; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346,
1915, 1915A; and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997–1997h), modified section 1988 to limit attorney’s fees in
prison cases to 150 percent of any damages won and to no more than 150 percent of the hourly
rate received by court-appointed counsel, effectively reducing the hourly rate to a fraction of
the “market rate” allowed in all other civil rights cases. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(2007). Today,
unless a prisoner has died or suffered some egregious injury, no private plaintiffs’ lawyer will
look at the case. Fee shifting has been taken out of the equation in this setting as well—the one
setting where serious constitutional violations are likely to occur with regularity, but produce
low or modest damages (because the injured plaintiffs will have neither compensable medical
costs nor work-loss claims).
141. Even if the ad damnum clause—the amount requested by way of relief—were included
in the data, it would be close to meaningless. Plaintiffs have little choice but to plead high
damages in all cases either (a) to meet the court’s jurisdictional limit, or (b) to avoid being
impeached with their pleadings at trial.
142. Because filing pro se is no easy matter, for comparative purposes I will treat the data as
if all cases were filed by attorneys, every year.
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roughly constant over the last thirty years. Plainly, voting rights,143
welfare,144 and housing145 are highly specialized practices; there is no
generalized legal “market” for such cases among the private plaintiffs’
bar. Fourth, employment cases—which have accounted for close to
half of all civil rights cases over the years146—are atypical civil rights
cases when it comes to tracking the effects of fee-shifting. They tend
to be higher-damages cases, and they present other opportunities for
the lawyer to be paid, so that arguably fee-shifting plays a different
role.147
As a result, the most useful statistical category may be the catchall category of “other” civil rights cases—the mixture of cases that
does not fit more comfortably into voting, welfare, housing, or
143. See Appendix, Chart, supra note 138. Since 1976, on average only 199 voting civil rights
cases have been filed a year. The numbers fluctuate somewhat, with the peaks predictably tied
to election year cycles. For 2005, 166 voting cases were filed out of more than 36,096 total civil
rights cases. Id.
144. Id. Since 1976, on average only 138 welfare civil rights cases have been filed per year.
Nearly all of these cases must have been filed by LSC lawyers, whose clients are often on
welfare and therefore would be the people affected by state laws or policies (relating to federal
assistance programs) that violate federal law. This intuition is supported by the fact that from
1976 to 1996, welfare civil rights case filings averaged 167 cases a year, while after 1996 the
average number dropped to sixty-eight cases a year. Recall that 1996 was the year Congress
placed restrictions on LSC lawyers’ ability to handle so-called “impact litigation.” See supra
note 10.
145. See Appendix, Chart, supra note 138. Since 1976, an average of 642 housing civil rights
cases have been filed a year. The housing cases—unlike voting and welfare cases—can include
significant damages. The private bar often can afford to take these cases, especially if there is
evidence of intentional discrimination. In my part of the country, these cases are typically
brought with the cooperation of a fair housing center or similar consumer “testing”
organization. If testing confirms the plaintiff’s account of overt discrimination, private lawyers
are willing to take the cases on the theory that they can win on summary judgment or get an
early settlement. The number of violations is low enough today that few lawyers are going to
build a practice exclusively out of housing civil rights cases, but the nature of the proof and the
risk of relatively high damages make it harder for defense counsel to make plausible Evans
offers in these cases.
146. See Appendix, Chart, supra note 138.
147. Plaintiffs’ employment lawyers are different from plaintiffs’ tort lawyers in the way
they evaluate a case. In an employment case, the typical plaintiff has been ill-treated in some
way on the job: the case presents an issue of hiring, firing, promotion, unfair treatment, or
hostile work environment. Successful employment plaintiffs may thus win something—a job, a
promotion, or a wage-based judgment—out of which the lawyer can reasonably expect to be
paid. In this sense, employment plaintiffs with relatively modest claims are not like tort
plaintiffs: they are more likely to find a lawyer to represent them with or without fee-shifting,
because the lawyer has a greater chance of making money on the case. But see Davies, supra
note 34, at 234–35 (noting that employment lawyers will not represent blue-collar workers (who
are unlikely to be able to pay) absent a good chance of winning punitive damages). And even in
employment cases, the perception within the plaintiffs’ bar is that lawyers are fleeing the
specialty because the law has changed enough that they cannot reliably make money on the
cases. See, e.g., Sternlight, supra note 112, at 538 n.6, 539.
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employment. Accordingly, if we look at both total filings and “other”
civil rights filings, the results are slightly more revealing. They show a
steady increase in cases filed after the passage of the Fees Act in
148
1976.
Indeed, in the decade from 1976 to 1985, the “other” civil
rights filings increased by seventy-seven percent, while all civil rights
filings increased by fifty-nine percent.149
After Evans came down in 1986, “other” civil rights claims and
total civil rights claims dropped until 1991,150 when passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 brought a flood of new civil rights filings,
151
which peaked five years later in 1997. Since 1997, the “other” civil
rights filings have been virtually flat, while the total number of civil
rights filings has dropped about seventeen percent.152
The available data say little about the effect of Evans (or
Buckhannon or other cases). When new civil rights statutes are
passed, lots of new cases are filed for a while, and thereafter lawyers
modify their practices in response to their experience. In the two
decades since Evans, private plaintiffs’ lawyers have stopped taking
low-damages and injunctive-relief civil rights cases because the
lawyers have learned that they cannot make money on them.

148. Brand, supra note 30, at 362 n.416, (quoting Robert A. Diamond, The Firestorm Over
Attorney Fee Awards, 69 A.B.A. J. 1420 (1983)), reports a sixty-six percent increase in civil
rights filings in the five years after passage of the Fees Act. But Diamond was including
prisoners’ civil rights cases as well. Because prisoners have only limited access to the private
bar, it makes little sense to include them for purposes of measuring the effects of Evans.
149. See Appendix, Chart, supra note 138. Of course, the total of all civil filings in all
categories of cases went up ninety-five percent, so it is hard to attribute the rise in civil rights
cases solely to the passage of the Fees Act.
150. Id. Again, all civil filings declined in the same period, so attributing the decline to
Evans is unreliable.
151. The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts itself notes that civil rights filings tend to
jump in the years following the passage of a new civil rights act (for example, disability
law/handicap rights, fair housing, children’s rights), but then level off or even decline “as
Supreme Court decisions and legislative actions offset the impact of the original legislation.”
See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, OFFICE OF HUMAN RES. & STATISTICS FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CASELOAD: RECENT TRENDS at 10 n.9 (1997–2001), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/recenttrends2001/20015yr.pdf. (quoting ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, ANALYTICAL SERVICES OFFICE REPORT TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL
STATISTICS ON INCREASES IN CIVIL RIGHTS FILINGS (Feb. 1998)). Lawyers move out of the
new practice area as they find it less lucrative than they had expected it to be.
152. See Appendix, Chart, supra note 138. The decline came mostly from the steep drop in
employment cases, which fell by twenty-nine percent from 1997 to 2005. Id.
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V. THE FIX
Congress can easily revitalize section 1983 by amending the Fees
153
Act to undo Evans. Justice Brennan laid out the fix in his dissent:
permit limited simultaneous negotiation of merits and fees, but
require court review of all settlements (not just in class actions) and
prohibit settlements in which the plaintiffs’ lawyers do not earn
reasonable fees.154 In this way attorney’s fees can still be negotiated
across a range of outcomes,155 but in the end the parties will have to
live with the court’s decision on the reasonableness of the fee, or they
will have to withdraw their agreement and try the case. The district
court will police settlements using a standard of review based on the
underlying policy of the Fees Act: that reasonable attorney’s fees are
necessary in every case to ensure that civil rights plaintiffs with
meritorious claims can find private lawyers to represent them.
Regarding Buckhannon, as Justice Scalia noted in his concurring
opinion,156 Congress need only change a few words in section 1988 to
make it clear that the term “prevailing party” can include any
favorable result linked to the filing of the lawsuit. Once the statute
specifically adopts the catalyst theory of attorney’s fees, the incentive
structure will be restored to what it was before 2001, and more private
plaintiffs’ lawyers will accept civil rights cases seeking only equitable
relief (assuming the Evans problem is fixed at the same time).157

153. Congress amended the Fees Act in 1991, see supra note 113, but it did not overturn
Evans. See, e.g., Cmty. Care Centers v. Ind. Family and Soc. Servs. Admin., 716 N.E.2d 519, 535
n.26 (Ind. App. 1999) (citing Ronald D. Rotunda, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A Brief
Introductory Analysis of the Congressional Response to Judicial Interpretation, 68 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 923, 949 n.119 (1993) (noting that although Congress considered overruling Evans, that
provision did not make it in to the final version of the bill)).
154. Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 753–54 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
155. The negotiation could proceed along the lines of what happens currently when the
plaintiff wins at trial and submits a formal fee petition: the defense typically challenges the rate,
the number of hours, the success on the various claims, duplication of effort by co-counsel, etc.
The defense could also seek to trade some of the fees for better relief. The defense may well be
able persuade the court to reduce the requested fees considerably, but at the same time the
court will ensure that the prevailing plaintiff is awarded reasonable attorney’s fees to fulfill the
purposes of the Act—to attract private attorneys general to litigate civil rights cases that
otherwise would not be brought if left to the private tort market.
156. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532
U.S. 598, 622 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring).
157. Justice Scalia would prefer to see a higher standard—“at least a substantial likelihood
that the party requesting fees would have prevailed”—to prevent plaintiffs from extorting
attorney’s fees from defendants in weak cases. Id. If the plaintiffs’ case is weak, however, then
the defendants should have greater leverage in the negotiation, both on the merits and on the
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The incentives built in to section 1988 can be quickly and easily
restored. Individual plaintiffs with strong civil rights claims but low
damages would again be able to get their cases to court, and liable
defendants would again have every reason to resolve these cases
early, thus promoting efficient docket control. The deterrent effect of
section 1983 would also be restored, as defendants would have to
conform their conduct to the requirements of the law or pay both
damages and attorney’s fees for any breach. Finally, access to justice
would not be limited to the lucky few in big cities in populous states
but would be equally available everywhere that lawyers hang a
shingle.158
CONCLUSION
[I]t does not require a sociological study to see that permitting fee
waivers will make it more difficult for civil rights plaintiffs to
159
obtain legal assistance. It requires only common sense.

When Evans came down in 1986, its potential to alter existing civil
rights practice was clear. The parties addressed it in their briefs, and
the Justices debated it in their opinions. The academic reaction was
swift and negative. Nevertheless, in the two decades since, the issue of
access to the courts has all but dropped off the radar screen.
In my view, the absence of ongoing debate on Evans is
understandable. The plaintiffs who lost their access to the courts are
random civil rights or “constitutional tort” victims. We cannot identify
them, and they cannot identify each other. They share nothing
beyond the fact of having a claim cognizable under section 1983 for
violation of their rights. As a group they have no political power and
no means to organize. Without lawyers, no one is going to speak for
them, let alone with a strong or unified voice.

fees (as well as in persuading the district court that a lower fee is reasonable under the
circumstances).
158. Other commentators have floated more elaborate or more drastic proposals, but in my
view the simplest fix is the best. See, e.g., Elledge, supra note 35, at 1034–36; Krulewitch, supra
note 31, at 128 (both recommending banning fee waivers); Stedman, supra note 31, at 1308–19
(advocating a full rewrite of the law); Sternlight, supra note 112, at 599–606 (advocating a
panoply of amendments, including higher hourly rates, contingency and delay enhancements,
fees for administrative work, prohibition of fee waivers, expert witness fees, and fees against
intervenors); McCormick, supra note 35, at 416 (urging the prohibition of fee waivers).
159. Evans, 475 U.S. at 755 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Likewise, the lawyers who represented them and whose practices
Evans destroyed were not the rich and powerful members of the highend plaintiffs’ personal-injury bar. Rather, they were mostly solo or
small-firm practitioners with mixed civil practices, for whom feeshifting provided a way to widen their services to include lowdamages or injunctive-relief civil rights cases. When Evans caused the
market for civil rights cases to crash, these lawyers simply slid across
to other specialties where they could earn a living.
Accordingly, unless something galvanizes Congress to act on its
own, as Alyeska did in 1975, no constituency exists to advocate for the
rights of plaintiffs with strong civil rights claims but low damages, or
plaintiffs who need injunctive relief to cure a civil rights violation.
Especially in the 1990s, when Congress was doing everything it could
to limit access to the courts, the unfairness of Evans got little
attention. Nor was the state defense bar ever going to raise the issue.
In Evans, the defense bar won an epic victory for its state-actor
clients, blocking injured plaintiffs from ever getting to court. The
defense bar knows when to bite its tongue.
On the other hand, the benefits of using “private attorneys
general” to enforce civil rights laws are legion, as the sponsors and
supporters of the Fees Act were well aware in 1976. First, private
lawyers are not geographically limited. Fee-shifting creates the same
powerful incentive across the country, in big cities and in small towns,
wherever lawyers work. Fee-shifting harnesses their self-interest and
turns it to the public good in a ubiquitous market. Second, “private
attorneys general” require neither infrastructure nor support. No
public funds have to be spent on their recruitment, staffing, training,
organization, or oversight. They even tend to establish their own
centers of expertise, as they trade information and create networks in
the same ways that other legal specialists do.
Third, “private attorneys general” are supremely efficient. Until
Evans, the Fees Act was a quiet but powerful engine of justice,
righting legal wrongs as Congress intended. The engine was fueled by
profit, but the profit was modest, at reasonable market rates.
Congress understood that if defendants could be made to pay the
costs of their malfeasance, private lawyers would step forward to do
the work, with the exemplary efficiency of any other market. Fourth,
“private attorneys general” are self-policing. Because they can only
make money on meritorious cases, they tend to filter out the very
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cases that Congress would want filtered out—namely nuisance
lawsuits and other meritless actions.160
Justice Brennan was right: today plaintiffs with low damages or
those seeking injunctive relief have no remedy under section 1983,
because no lawyers will take their cases to court. Evans dismantled
the mechanism that funded the “private attorneys general” who gave
life and meaning to the Civil Rights Act. The death of section 1983
for these plaintiffs is not an exaggeration, and Congress should take
immediate steps to resurrect it by amending the Fees Act.

160. Requiring closer judicial supervision of all fee awards will serve as a further screening
device, discouraging lawyers who might otherwise bring weak cases in an effort to “extort” fees
from defendants.
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APPENDIX
Year

Voting

Employment

Housing

Welfare

Other

Total

All
Cases

1975

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

1976

176

5,321

531

222

N/A

10,392

117,320

6,079

12,329

130,597

1977

203

5,931

442

1978

139

5,504

497

219

6,318

13,113

130,567

214

6,475

12,829

138,770

1979

145

5,477

1980

160

5,017

434

195

6,917

13,168

154,666

342

212

7,213

12,944

168,789

1981

152

1982

170

6,245

336

253

8,433

15,419

180,576

7,689

237

215

8,727

17,038

206,193

1983
1984

175

9,097

296

229

9,938

19,735

241,842

259

9,748

291

183

10,738

21,219

261,485

1985

281

8,082

253

180

10,757

19,553

273,670

1986

194

9,174

230

164

10,366

20,128

254,828

1987

214

8,993

323

158

10,117

19,805

239,185

1988

347

8,563

322

129

9,962

19,323

239,634

1989

183

9,000

334

122

9,739

19,378

233,529

1990

130

8,413

341

129

9,780

18,793

217,879

1991

247

8,370

452

130

10,693

19,892

210,890

1992*

494

10,771

527

125

12,316

24,233

230,509

1993

213

12,962

590

114

13,776

27,655

229,850

1994

224

15,965

730

122

15,581

32,622

236,391

1995

208

19,059

735

116

16,482

36,600

248,335

1996

229

23,152

932

83

17,611

42,007

269,132

1997

141

23,796

854

91

18,396

43,278

272,027

1998

108

23,735

838

66

17,607

42,354

256,787

1999

102

22,490

1,136

63

17,513

41,304

260,271

2000

167

21,032

1,284

80

18,345

40,908

259,517

2001

195

21,157

1,249

61

18,248

40,910

250,907

2002

234

20,955

1,313

71

17,847

40,420

274,841

2003

147

20,507

1,315

65

18,482

40,516

252,962

2004

173

19,746

1,222

61

19,037

40,239

281,338

2005

166

16,930

885

54

18,061

36,096

253,273

2006**

150

14,353

643

56

17,663

32,865

259,541
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Where figures do not match year-to-year, I have used the figures
compiled or reported at the latest date. The Administrative Office of
the U.S. Courts notes that it adjusts its figures as better data become
available, and that the latest figures are the most accurate. Thus, for
example, if the 1992 chart also shows the figures for the previous year
(1991), I use the figures from the 1992 chart, assuming that they have
been updated from the originally reported 1991 figures.
* Current year figures used because current year figures were the
only available source
** Incomplete partial-year statistics

